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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
1 Introduction
The banking industry is usually excluded from theoretical and empirical studies
on general manufacturing industries due to complications associated with the exten-
sive regulations placed upon this industry and the special characteristics of banks as
suppliers of the intermediation services. Nevertheless, regulatory reforms in the U.S.
banking industry since the 1990s have not only fundamentally modernized this age-
old industry but have also provided us with some natural experiments on its operation
and management strategies.
One di¢ culty in economic studies is that we can not conduct experiments, as
scientists do, to directly test economic theories. However, sometimes an isolated
change occurs in one aspect of the economic environment and economists can study
the e¤ects of that change as if it were an experiment, given that every other exogenous
factors was held constant. These types of events and changes are called natural
experiments, which are naturally occurring events or situations, and which can be
exploited by a researcher to help answer a research question.1
The rst natural experiment of my analysis has been provided by the enactment
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Another
natural experiment investigated in my research concerns the passage of the Riegle
1Note that these types of experiments are quasi-experiments in that the experimenter has little
or no control over the situation that is being observed.
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Neal Interstate Banking and Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994. Section 2 and section
3 of this chapter respectively introduce the background, purpose, methodology and
main results of these two natural experiments.
2 FDICIA and Market Discipline
2.1 How does market discipline work?
In order to maintain the health of the banking industry, banking regulators have
been making e¤orts to promote the safe management of banks. Market discipline,
as a supervising device from "the private sector," which supplements the thorough
and regularly arranged on-site examinations, has attracted more and more attention
of banking regulators and economists. As a matter of fact, market discipline, along
with minimum capital requirement and supervisory review processes, is included in
the New Basel Accord as one of the three pillars of healthy banking structure. In
the banking industry, market discipline is described as a mechanism in which "the
nancial market provides signals that lead borrowers (i.e., banks) to behave in a
manner consistent with their solvency" (Lane, 1993).
It has been noted that the implementation of market discipline, a supervising
device from "the private sector," could be highly correlated with the e¤orts from
"the regulatory sector," which also aim to safeguard the health of the banking system
(Bruni and Paterno, 1995). Federal Deposit Insurance, which came into e¤ect in 1934,
is one of these regulatory solutions, that was designed to protect small depositors, to
restore depositorscondence in banks and thus prevent the systemwide bank runs
resulting from the asymmetric information between banks and depositors that had
2
historically caused several debacles in the U.S. economy. Thanks to Federal Deposit
Insurance, small depositors (usually with deposits less than $100,000) at failed banks
have always been fully protected, and nationwide banking panics no longer haunt
the U.S. economy. Furthermore, since the enactment of Federal Deposit Insurance,
uninsured creditors have naturally been expected to play a critical role in practicing
market discipline on banks. Since their loss cannot be recovered in the case of bank
failures, they are motivated to monitor banksdefault risks. Specically, uninsured
creditors would charge a higher rate to compensate for the higher risk they assume
or else withdraw their investment when observing higher default risks.
The balance between " the private sector" supervising device and " the regulatory
sector" protection has over time been harmed, however. The incentives of uninsured
creditors to monitor banksdefault risks have been reduced by a series of forbearance
policies announced by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), which al-
lows insolvent institutions to remain open in the hope that they would in time recover.
Due to protection from these forbearance policies, the expected losses of uninsured
creditors were signicantly reduced so that while uninsured creditors faced default
risk in theory, many of them were shielded from losses in practice. Between 1979 and
1989, 99.7 percent of all deposit liabilities at failed commercial banks were protected.
The deteriorating moral hazard problem as a result of reducing the monitoring on
banksdefault risks was taken as one of the main factors that led to the bank debacles
in the 1980s (Osborne and Lee, 2001).
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2.2 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
In response to these failures, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act (FDICIA) was passed in 1991 to restore the health of the banking industry.
The provisions of the Act forced uninsured creditors to bear much more of the losses
associated with bank insolvency. The provisions were expected to increase the incen-
tives of uninsured creditors to monitor banksrisk-taking behavior so as to improve
market discipline from uninsured depositors. The enactment of the FDICIA has
therefore provided us with a natural experiment in examining how changes in the
regulatory design, the banking system safeguarding devices from "the regulatory sec-
tion," could impact the implementation of banking system safeguarding devices from
"the private sector."
Among the various uninsured creditors, the holders of time certicates of $100,000
or more (Jumbo CDs) are chosen as subjects for this study. On one hand, the balances
of Jumbo CDs are beyond the deposit-insurance ceiling of $100,000 as a counterpart to
core deposits, such as checkable deposits, passbook savings, and retail CDs, which are
fully protected by Federal Deposit Insurance and respond relatively little to changes
in bank conditions and market rates. On the other hand, Jumbo CDs have relatively
large uninsured balances and short maturities, which make issuing banks match yields
(risk-free interest rates plus default risk premia) asked for by uninsured depositors
in the market.2 The pricing system of Jumbo CDs could therefore be an excellent
indicator of the mechanism of market discipline in the banking industry.
2For example,the average jumbo CD balance in the fourth quarter of 2005 was $330,886 and the
average balance in 95 percent of the U.S. banks exceeded $152,115. Besides, the average maturity
was just over one year(Feldman and Schmidt, 2005).
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2.3 Methodology Overview and Main Result
This study sets up a theoretical framework of market discipline based on Jordan
(2000) in which the market for deposits is described as an interaction between the
supply side (both insured and uninsured depositors) and the demand side (bank)
wherein market discipline is captured by an upward shifting of the marginal cost
curve of uninsured deposits when bank default risk increases. Although previous
empirical studies that directly or indirectly look at the FDICIA and its e¤ect on
market discipline through the Jumbo CD market did nd that interest rates and the
quantity of uninsured CDs are sensitive to bank risk, they did not nd strong evidence
that market discipline from Jumbo CD holders improved after the enactment of the
FDICIA. This study proposes a new perspective on the impact of the FDICIA on
market discipline. It seeks to explore the dynamic links between interest rate premia
and risk measures in a cross-bank framework to take into account the stickiness of
interest rates and lags in the e¤ect of changes in bank risk. At the same time, this
study also contributes to the literature by examining how bank managers respond to
or prevent the excessive funding costs associated with Jumbo CD holdersdiscipline.
To accomplish this task, I use an adaptation of the generalized method of mo-
ments technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). My method eliminates
bank-specic xed e¤ects by taking rst order di¤erences of all variables in a model
originally specied in levels, and then using the predetermined lags of the endogenous
system variables as instruments to exploit a large set of over-identifying restrictions
so as to attain consistent estimators. Specically, I collect quarterly data for U.S.
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commercial banks for ve years prior to the FDICIA (1984-1989) and ve years after
the FDICIA began to take e¤ect (1992-1996), and then construct the risk measures
based on accounting numbers available from Call Reports. Along with controlling for
e¤ects from the demand side, I apply two-way Granger-Causality tests for the panel
to capture the timeliness(predictive power of changes in risk measures on changes
in the interest rate spread) and e¤ectiveness (predictive power of changes in the
interest rate spread on changes in risk measures) of market discipline from uninsured
depositors such as Jumbo CD holders.
I nd clear-cut evidence that the improved regulatory environment provided by
the FDICIA has successfully revived incentives for uninsured depositors to monitor
nancial institutionsdefault risk and has motivated nancial institutions to be more
responsive to market discipline by engaging in "self-corrective" actions.
3 Interstate Branching Mode Choice and Branch Performance Outcome
3.1 A Brief History of Branching Regulations in U.S. Banking Industry
The U.S. banking industry has a long and unique history of restrictions on branch-
ing. By the early twentieth century, the U.S. had become the only industrialized
nation that still retained these restrictions (Giedeman, 2004). In the early stages of
American banking system development, banking markets were naturally fragmented
by high managing and transportation costs in the absence of an established railroad
system and telegraph networks. In the late nineteenth century, state authorities be-
gan to set statutory barriers to bank branching in order to preserve the monopolies
or oligopolies of local community banks (Golembe, 1994). This situation eventually
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led to the federal prohibition of interstate and intrastate banking with the passage of
the National Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864.
The deregulation of branching restrictions began with intrastate branching. The
McFadden Act of 1927 allowed national banks to operate under the same branch-
ing laws prevailing for state-chartered banks in the states in which they were lo-
cated. Therefore, national banks were able to realize intrastate branching to some
degree since in the early 1900s, states began to permit intrastate branching for state-
chartered banks. Further, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 set national banks on equal
footing with state-chartered banks regarding the right to branch statewide although it
gave state regulatory authorities the dominant position in determining the intrastate
branching law in each state. Therefore, restrictions on intrastate branching were
generally removed while interstate branching was strictly prohibited at that time.
The general prohibition of interstate branching operations spawned multibank
holding companies (MBHCs) in the sense that they provided a legal loophole to
realize geographic diversication despite branching restrictions. In practice, banks
(both national and state banks) that wanted to expand their operations to other
markets, especially in states other than where their headquarters were, could set
up start-up banks as subsidiaries instead of branches. Although each subsidiary
owned by the holding company had to be separately capitalized and to have its own
board of directors which was presumed to bring about more operating costs than a
network of branch o¢ ces, the MBHC structure did open an opportunity for interstate
expansion. A holding companys management could still integrate production and a
7
decision system across its subsidiaries. However, the Douglas Amendment of the 1956
Bank Holding Company Act closed this loophole by allowing states the authority to
prohibit out-of-state BHCs from operating banks within their borders.
The past decade has witnessed fundamental deregulations in the American bank-
ing industry especially in respect to branching authority. One of the most important
acts of deregulation on branching was the passage of the RiegleNeal Interstate Bank-
ing and Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994. This act enabled banking organizations
to increase the size and reach of their operations through interstate branching. The
Riegle-Neal Act allowed bank holding companies to acquire out-of-state banks, al-
lowed foreign banks to interstate branch and enabled banks to operate interstate
branches via mergers or the acquisition of incumbent banks. However, the Riegle-
Neal Act treats two modes of interstate branching in distinct ways. The Act allows
interstate branching through de novo branching (establishing new o¢ ces without an
acquisition) only if the host state enacts legislation expressly permitting it. By the
beginning of 1997 which was the "trigger year" of the Riegle-Neal Act, only nine
states in addition to the District of Columbia allowed de novo interstate branching,
while eight of them allowed de novo interstate branching on a reciprocal basis.
3.2 The Debate on De Novo Interstate Branching
After the Riegle-Neal Act had been in e¤ect for about 10 years, the issue of de
novo interstate branching was again brought forth: For several years, the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act has been in debate in Congress. It proposes to remove
the requirement that states must opt-in to de novo interstate branching, thereby
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allowing banks to freely establish de novo branches nationwide. Opponents to free
de novo interstate branching are usually concerned that de novo branches of entrant
banks might dominate the local market and thus harm the services for the local
economies that are usually provided by local banks
However, it has been well-accepted that interstate branching has beneted both
the development of the banking industry and the overall economy. In 2004, commer-
cial banks operated more than 65,000 branches in the US, a big increase in number
compared with 51,000 branches operated by commercial banks in 1990 (Olson, 2002).
The new branches, especially the branches of out-of-state banks, help maintain the
competitiveness and dynamism of the American banking industry and raise the acces-
sibility of banking services in previously under-served markets. Both households and
small businesses can benet from the branch entries of out-of-state banks since their
entry into the market could decrease the degree of concentration in the local market.
They can also stimulate competition, which in turn can bring about better and more
available banking services, lower interest rates on loans and higher deposit interest
rates. Furthermore, since current customers have become more mobile, working and
operating across state borders, they could also benet from banks operating branches
across state lines. At the same time, we also note that restrictions on interstate de
novo branching might limit the development of the banking industry as well as the
economy. For example, restrictions on interstate de novo branching might set a par-
ticularly high barrier against small banks entering a new market since they usually
cannot a¤ord the high cost of acquiring another bank.
9
3.3 Methodology Overview and Main Results
This study examines the impact of de novo branching on local economy by in-
vestigating the operating strategies and associated performance outcomes of entrant
banks regarding their choices of interstate branching modes in the states where both
two interstate branching modes (mergers or acquisitions of incumbent banks and de
novo branching) are allowed after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994.
Few studies focus on the impact of choice of interstate branching mode, although
some studies do shed some light on the impact of general interstate branching on
the market concentration and the general performance of the banking industry. This
analysis contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it chooses a fresh angle in
looking at this question. Secondly, it proposes examining the impact of interstate
branching mode choice on entrant bank performance in host markets rather than
the conventional angle taken in the literature that examines the impact of entry
events on an entire market or industry. Therefore, the theoretical foundation of
our study is based on theories and concepts from both industry organization and
management strategy as well as monetary economics. Second, the application of
two-stage Heckman estimation corrects for endogeneity problems usually neglected in
conventional studies on the impact of management strategy on performance. I also
derive entrant bank countere¤ect performance gains/loss in taking the alternative
interstate branching mode in order to test whether bank managements made the
right strategic decisions.
I nd that, without interstate branching restrictions, small commercial banks
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signicantly prefer de novo interstate branching to branching via M&A. When the
host market is not very competitive (HHI<1000), entrant banks are prone to take
the mode of de novo branching rather than M&A. Moreover, the high potential of
economic growth seems to tempt entrant banks to enter via M&A more frequently
than by de novo branching. Further, the more states into which an entrant bank has
already expanded, the more likely it is to enter via de novo branching. After the
endogeneity problems associated with selection bias were tackled, the performance
estimations and derived treatment e¤ects for three groups of performance measures
show that entrant banks choosing interstate branching via M&A have absolute per-
formance advantages over entrant banks setting up de novo branches. However, both
groups of banks categorized by their choice of interstate branching mode made the
right decision because they would not have been better o¤ had they chosen the alter-
native strategy. Therefore, free interstate de novo branching would invite more small
banks, which could prove benecial to the development of small business in the host
state without posing much threat to incumbent banks.
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CHAPTER II
FDICIA AND MARKET DISCIPLINE:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
The prominent work by Lane (1993) denes market discipline as nancial markets
providing signals that lead borrowers (i.e., banks) to behave in a manner consistent
with their solvency.Today, supervisors in the developed world have counted more
and more on the market as a means of supervision. In the recently proposed New Basel
Capital Accord, market discipline is adopted as one of the three pillars of the structure
safeguarding the banking system, along with capital regulation and supervision.
It is widely accepted that market discipline can be executed by three classes of
bank creditors: depositors, debt-holders and equity-holders. Since the returns of
these stakeholders should be negatively related to default risks of banks and these
stakeholders should be able to access banksconditions in a nearly e¢ cient market,
they should demand higher risk premia from riskier banks or otherwise withdraw
their deposits from them. Such a response to banksrisk-taking behavior might be
expected to discourage bank managers from raising the level of risk on the asset sides
of their balance sheets too dramatically.
To restore condence in the nancial markets after the severe banking crisis fol-
lowing the Great Depression in the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) was created in 1933, and Federal Deposit Insurance became ef-
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fective on January 1st, 1934. With the protection of deposit insurance, insured stake-
holders had less incentive to monitor banks. This situation occurred because their
deposits became safe regardless of the banks performance. In this setting, uninsured
stakeholders were expected to play a critical role in practicing market discipline on
banks.
However, the incentives of uninsured creditors to monitor banksinsolvency risk
have over time been attenuated by a series of forbearance policies that allowed in-
solvent institutions to remain open in the hope that they would in time recover,
discouraging uninsured stakeholders from playing this role. One manifestation of
such a policy is the "too big to fail" doctrine rst introduced in May 1984 to pre-
vent the potential systemic consequences associated with the failure of Continental
Illinois by covering the losses of all creditors, including the uninsured. Soon after
that, eleven of the largest national banks were o¢ cially pronounced too big to fail. In
1986, the FDIC announced a Capital Forbearance Program that was designed to help
banks that had experienced solvency problems due to economic conditions judged to
be beyond their control. Moreover, in 1987, the Competitive Equality Banking Act
(CEBA) established the Agricultural Loan Loss Amortization Program (ALLAP).
Under this program, banks with less than $100 million in total assets and with agri-
cultural loans of at least 25 percent of total loans were allowed to defer recognition of
losses on such loans and to amortize them over ten years. In fact, the FDIC granted
forbearance to 325 banks under these programs between June 1986 and December
1989 (Brinkman and Huang, 1996).
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Although forbearance policies were designed to rescue banks su¤ering losses due
to economic shocks rather than from poor management and risk-taking behavior,
thereby helping them to raise new capital, the overprotection did lower stakeholders
incentives to monitor banksbehavior so that moral hazard problems increased. The
negative impact of the deposit insurance system on nancial markets nally led to
the bank failures of the 1970s and 1980s. As a matter of fact, at the end of 1990,
the U.S. banking system was in its worst condition since 1933. Indeed, during the
1980s more that 2,000 depository institutions went bankrupt, many at a high cost
to both shareholders and taxpayers. The ultimate cost of the resolution of insolvent
institutions paid by US taxpayers turned out to be almost 3% of GDP (Benston and
Kaufman, 1998).
To restore the health of the banking industry, Congress in 1991 enacted the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). The Act brought with
it fundamental deposit insurance and prudential regulatory reform and was arguably
the most important banking legislation since the Banking Act of 1933. Provisions
such as prompt corrective action (PAC) and mandatory regular examinations aimed
to reduce the cost of providing deposit insurance by lowering the likelihood of bank
failures via capital level requirements and increased exam frequencies. Provisions
of the FDICIA include abandonment of forbearance, especially the too big to fail
policy for large banks. On one hand, FDICIA put more restrictions on forbearance
policy by requiring the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, as well as a two-
thirds majority of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the directors
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of the FDIC before the approval of forbearance or an announcement of too big to
fail.On the other hand, instead of the simple purchase of default banks, FDICIA also
proposed a less expensive means of failure resolution, which made uninsured creditors
share the losses. In fact, in the three years prior to the FDICIA (from 1988 to 1990),
Jumbo CD holders su¤ered losses in only 15 percent of bank failures, while Jumbo-
CD holders su¤ered losses in 82 percent of bank failures in the 3 years following the
full implementation of the FDICIA ( from 1993 to 1995) (Benston and Kaufman,
1998). Market discipline was therefore expected to improve after the FDICIA since
the provisions of the FDICIA forced uninsured creditors to bear much more of the
losses due to bank insolvency so as to increase the incentives of uninsured creditors
to monitor banksrisk-taking behavior.
Since no other banking regulations a¤ecting loss exposure took e¤ect around the
year the FDICIA was passed, it provided a natural experiment for examining the
e¤ect of the Act on the likelihood that uninsured depositors would discipline risky
banks. Among di¤erent uninsured creditors, holders of time certicates of $100,000
or more (Jumbo CDs) are natural subjects for study since the balances of Jumbo CDs
are beyond the deposit-insurance ceiling of $100,000.3 Further, Jumbo CDs have been
an important source of bank funds. For example, by the end of 2002, U.S. commercial
banks funded 12.7 percent of assets with Jumbo CDs (Vaughan et al., 2004).
This study applies Arellanos and Bonds (1991) GMM technique to quarterly
data from 1985 to 1996 for 50 commercial banks with the largest share of Jumbo CDs
3Equity and subordinated debt holders are also uninsured creditors that are studied in literature
and there might be some di¤erence in the e¤ectiveness of these capital instruments (Caldwell 2007).
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in their total deposits to examine the two-way Granger causality relation between
Jumbo CD risk premia and bank risk. I nd strong evidence for the notion that
increases in bank risk have predictive power for increases in risk premia banks would
have to pay, especially since the enactment of FDICIA. At the same time, the tests for
reverse causality between risk measures and risk premia shows that the self-correction
behavior of banks improved after the FDICIA when moral hazard problems were at-
tenuated. The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: section 2 summarizes previous
studies; section 3 proposes the research strategies and innovations of this study; data
and estimation methodology are described in section 4; section 5 presents the results
and concluding remarks are stated in section 6.
2 Literature Review
Previous studies on market discipline have employed cross-sectional and/or time-
series regressions of Jumbo CD variables on bank risk measures (both publicly avail-
able and private measures such as CAMEL ratings and SEER4), market risk factors,
and seasonal or other bank-specic controls. These empirical studies can be divided
into three categories based on the risk premium measures they use: 1) interest rate
spreads; 2) quantities 3) both interest rate spreads and quantities.
The rst group of studies examines whether the interest rates that Jumbo CD
holders require adjust to banksdefault risks. Herzig-Marx and Weaver (1979) ex-
amine the econometric specication of an OLS regression equation for the impact
of bank risks on interest rates and sets the baseline for later studies such as Baer
4CAMEL is short for Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. SEER is
short for System to Estimate Examination Ratings.
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and Brewer (1986), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), James (1988, 1990), Cargill (1989),
Keely (1990), Ellis and Flannery (1992), Cook and Spellman (1994), and Brewer and
Mondschen (1994). In contrast to most studies that regress Jumbo CD interest rates
on bank-specic risk measures, a few studies take into account the e¤ect of mar-
ket risk introduced through equity volatility or innovation in the stock market (e.g.,
Baer and Brewer, 1986 and James, 1988, 1990). Many studies nd evidence that
uninsured depositors respond to bank risks that are observable from balance sheet
information. However, there are also some studies that nd no signicant evidence
that uninsured depositors such as Jumbo CD holders impose market discipline on
banks. For example, Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) nd no such evidence when
analyzing three-month interest rates on large CDs and banksrisk-taking behavior
measured by the proportion of Standby Letters of Credit. Gilbert et al. (2001) nd
that the interest rates of Jumbo CDs have less predictive power than the traditional
supervisory ratings.
The second group of studies examine whether the quantities of Jumbo CDs sup-
plied by a bank can reect bank default risks (e.g., Goldberg and Hudgins, 1996,
2002 and Calomiris and Wilson, 1998). These studies nd that uninsured deposit
growth falls when a banks default risk increases. For example, Billet et al. (1998)
examine the relationship between changes in bank credit risk and the quantity of
insured deposits and observe that risky banks increase their use of insured deposits
following a downgrade by Moodys rating agency. Park and Peristiani (1998) nd that
riskier thrifts attract a smaller amount of uninsured deposits and that the response
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of uninsured depositors to risk is more evident than that observed among insured
depositors.5
The nal set of studies combines both price and quantity-based approaches by
looking at the e¤ect of banksinstitutional risks on both the pricing and quantity of
uninsured deposits. Note that previous two approaches assume that change either in
the price or quantity of Jumbo CDs results from the change of supply (Jumbo CD
holders). What I actually observe, however, are the equilibrium interest rate and the
equilibrium quantity resulting from an interaction between the banksdemand for and
depositorssupply of Jumbo CDs. In order to deal with this problem, several studies
propose considering price and quantity e¤ects at the same time.6 For example, Park
(1995), Park and Peristiani (1998), Martinez-Peria and Schmuckler (2001), Gilbert
et al.(2003), and Hall et al.(2002a, 2002b) nd evidence that interest rates paid on
deposits and the quantity of Jumbo CDs respond to changes in bank risk, although
in most cases the evidence is not statistically signicant and is economically small.
There is also considerable literature about the e¤ects of deposit insurance reform
that came with the FDICIA. Some contributors examine performance improvements
in the entire banking system. For example, Benston and Kaufman (1998) nd that
the banking system became signicantly healthier in the early 1990s in the sense
that the number of bank failures declined steadily and the industry became better
capitalized after the reform. Other studies focus on more specic mechanisms of the
5However, Jagtiani and Lemieux (2000) argue that risky banks, especially failing ones, tend to
replace their uninsured deposits with insured deposits to avoid discipline from markets of uninsured
deposits such as Jumbo CDs.
6Ideally, we need to specify a simultaneous equation model with demand and supply functions.
However, it is di¢ cult to identify those demand and supply functions due to lack of exogenous
variables that are signicant (Park, 1995).
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reform. For instance, Osborne and Lee (2001) study the e¤ects of deposit insurance
reform on moral hazard in US banking and nd that moral hazard problems were
alleviated after the reform.
There are also a few studies that directly or indirectly look at the FDICIA and its
e¤ect on market discipline through the Jumbo CD market. Looking at a sample of
failing New England banks from 1989 to 1995, Jordan (2000) nds that fully insured
deposits increased with the approach of failure more after the FDICIA, and that the
interest rate spread the failing banks were paying over the average level in the market
also rose. Goldberg and Hudgins (2002) study a sample of failed banks from 1984 to
1994, nding that Jumbo CD holdings fall as banks approach failure and that this
sensitivity mildly increased after the FDICIA. Hall et al. (2004) extend the study
of Goldberg-Hudgins (2002) by looking at both failing banks and surviving banks
and examining Jumbo CD yields as well as run-o¤s, since the decrease in quantity
of the Jumbo CDs of failing banks might have been due to supervisor discipline via
enforcement actions rather than market discipline. They also nd that interest rates
and the quantity of uninsured CDs are sensitive to bank risk, but interestingly nd
no evidence that the coe¢ cients are statistically or economically di¤erent across two
very di¤erent sample periods( i.e., pre-FDICIA and post-FDICIA). Their study thus
implies that the enforcement of FDICIA in 1991 did not a¤ect market discipline in
the Jumbo CD market.
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3 Research Strategies
In addition to following the main logic of previous studies, our study proposes
several di¤erent research strategies and innovations in methodology. One of the in-
novations I make is to explore dynamic links between risk premia and risk measures
in a cross-bank framework. Although many previous studies have samples of panel
data, most of them employ static econometric analysis without taking into account
the stickiness of interest rates and the dynamic e¤ects of changes in bank risk. This
situation might even explain why many earlier studies did not nd the statistically
signicant relations between risk measures and risk premia that were expected. In
this paper, I examine the magnitude and direction of the dynamic relations between
Jumbo CD risk premia and bank risks via the concept of Granger causality, and as
well as the ability of changes in risk measures to predict changes in risk premia and
vice versa. To implement this strategy, I employ the generalized method of moments
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel models. This
approach eliminates rm-specic e¤ects by taking the rst di¤erence of all variables
that are originally specied in levels. Through this action, the biases coming from
omitted variables and xed rm e¤ects are mitigated. In order to tackle the bias com-
ing from the possible correlation between the lags of the endogenous variables and
error terms, Arellano and Bond (1991) also propose a linear instrumental variables
technique that uses the predetermined lags of the system variables as instruments to
obtain consistent estimators. Moreover, since I examine the two-way relation between
bank risk and Jumbo CD risk premia, I can further examine banksself-correcting
behavior when facing an increase in risk premium in addition to testing the predicting
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power of changes in bank risk on risk premia. In this way, we can obtain some idea
of the e¤ectiveness of market discipline as imposed by Jumbo CD holders, a subject
that has not been considered in previous studies.7
Unlike some recent studies, mine focuses on the price-based approaches when
choosing risk premium measures. Some recent studies incorporate the price and quan-
tity of Jumbo CDs to describe the interaction of demand and supply e¤ects. However,
a simple set of two OLS regressions is inadequate because endogeneity problems may
lead to biased results unless a simultaneous equations model with proper instruments
for the interest rate is employed. Even though a simultaneous equation model might
be adequate, however, it is very di¢ cult to identify the demand and supply functions
due to a lack of exogenous variables that are signicant (Park, 1995).8 I therefore
set up a framework of the deposit market (insured deposits and uninsured deposits)
based on the one described in Jordan (2000) in which the equilibrium interest rate and
quantity of deposits are determined by the interaction of marginal cost (the supply
side) and marginal revenue (the demand side) (see gure 1). In gure 1, the horizontal
axis measures the quantity of deposits and the vertical axis measures the interest rate
spread. The supply of deposits is composed of two parts: insured deposits (denoted
as marginal curve MCi) and uninsured deposits (denoted as marginal curve MCui).
The demand of deposits is denoted as the downward sloping marginal cost curveMR.
This framework captures the fact that a bank raises insured deposits (e.g., check-
7Since risks measures are usually highly correlated with each other and because it is hard to nd
appropriate instruments for them, we respectively examine the two-way causality relations between
interest rate spreads and individual measures of bank risk one at a time.
8But this feature could represent possible further exploration on this topic.
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Figure 1: Base on Jordan (2000). This gure presents the impact of the shift-up of the marginal cost curve of
uninsured deposits (MCui) when uninsured depositors respond to an increase in banksdefault risks.
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ing or saving accounts) mostly from branches in local markets and raises uninsured
deposits (e.g., Jumbo CDs) from the national market. Since the quantity of core
deposits is limited by the customer base of local branches, the marginal cost curve
for insured deposits is steeper than that of Jumbo CDs. The di¤erence between these
two sources of deposits is shown in gure 1 whereMCi is steeper thanMCui. Within
this framework, market discipline imposed by uninsured depositors is equivalent to
an upward shift of the marginal cost curve of uninsured deposits when bank risks rise.
As shown in Figure 1, when the marginal cost curve for uninsured deposits (MCui;1)
shifts up (MCui;2) due to an increase in bank default risk, the equilibrium interest
rate of uninsured deposits rises from i1 to i2; and the quantity of uninsured deposits
decreases from Q1 to Q2.
However, shifts of the marginal cost curve for insured deposits and the marginal
revenue curve for deposits could also a¤ect the equilibrium interest rate and quantity,
and could possibly confound the results. Nevertheless, due to the relative atness
of the marginal cost curve for uninsured deposits, shifts of the marginal cost curve
for insured deposits might signicantly a¤ect the equilibrium quantity of Jumbo CDs
without much impact on the interest rates paid on Jumbo CDs.9 The shifts of the
marginal cost curve for insured deposits could result from economic or demographic
changes in the local market.10 Indeed, the results of previous studies show that the
sensitivity of interest rates (or yields) on Jumbo CDs to bank risks are greater than
9Especially note that shifts of the marginal cost curve for insured deposits do no, in most cases,
a¤ect the equilibrium interest rate of uninsured deposits.
10In fact, several studies also nd some evidence of market discipline from insured depositors
(e.g. Billet et al. 1998, Jagtiani and Lemieux 2000 and Martinez-Peria and Schmuckler 2001) which
implies that supply curve of insured deposits will also shift up when bank risks increase.
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the sensitivity of the quantity of Jumbo CDs (e.g., Park, 1995 and Martinez-Peria and
Schmuckler, 2000). Therefore, other than controlling for impacts from the demand
side (which will be discussed later), I propose focusing in this study on price-based
approaches when examining the market discipline of Jumbo CD holders.
Furthermore, I note that few studies specically control for possible impacts com-
ing from the demand side. This step is critical because what I want to study is
changes in the risk premia that uninsured depositors require rather than changes in
the equilibrium risk premia. Therefore, I include several bank-specic variables to
control for the demand e¤ect. For example, when banks face a low level of ROA
(return on assets), they usually increase leverage to increase returns on shareholders
equity,11 which means an increase in the demand for debts such as deposits.12 An-
other control variable for the demand e¤ect is the ratio of total demand deposit to
assets. Although some studies argue that the share of deposits in demand liabilities
indicates the local base of customers to whom Jumbo CDs are presumed to be sold
(Crane, 1979 and Hannan and Hanweck, 1988), other studies such as Jordan (2000)
point out that Jumbo CDs are actually traded nationally. Instead, since demand
deposits can be withdrawn at any time, banks tend to collect more deposits such
as Jumbo CDs when their assets become increasingly funded with demand deposits.
Therefore, I argue that, when the shares of demand deposits increase, banks increase
their demand for Jumbo CDs. Another control variable for the demand e¤ect that I
11Note that ROAROE=1  liabilityassets :
12Although ROA is often referred to as a performance measure, note that high bank risk does not
necessarily lead to a low or high return on assets. Therefore, we assume that ROA dose not have a
major e¤ect on depositorssupply of deposits.
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choose is bank size, since growth in assets usually means more lending activity, which
requires more deposits.
Another innovation in this study involves the calculation of Jumbo CD risk premia.
As discussed above, I select the Jumbo-CD interest rate spreads instead of quantities
as the measure of risk premium. I calculate the Jumbo CD interest rate spreads
in three steps. First, quarterly Jumbo CD interest expenses are divided by average
quarterly Jumbo CD quantity (data are available from the Call Reports) to obtain
the average nominal Jumbo CD interest rates. Second, I subtract the risk-free interest
rate of the 1-year maturity Treasury bill from the average interest rate to eliminate
the market e¤ect. Further, I calculate the forecasted ination rate at every time point
basing on historical ination rates to capture depositorssubjective depreciation.
4 Data and Estimation
This study relies on quarterly data for U.S. commercial banks, collected for ve
years before the FDICIA (1984-1989) and ve years after the FDICIA began to take
e¤ect (1992-1996). I leave some time gap between the pre- and post- periods to elimi-
nate the chaos right before the Act took e¤ect and the transitional stage right after its
enactment. The reason for the cut-o¤ of year 1996 is the passage the following year of
the Riegle-Neal Act, which allows interstate merger and acquisition among commer-
cial banks. The potential risk-diversication associated with interstate mergers and
acquisitions could, however, cancel out part of Jumbo CD holderspricing of bank risk
(Hall et al., 2004). Specically, I construct our variables from the income-statement
and balance-sheet numbers collected from the Report of Condition and Income (the
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Call Report), which are publicly available from the FDIC website. Although some
studies such as Hall et al. (2004) use non-public ratings such as SEER or Camel as
risk measures, I still select risk measures that are simply constructed, with publicly
available data, since that is exactly the information available to those Jumbo CD
holders when they execute their disciplining power.
I rene the sample size based on the banks operating-history and amount of
Jumbo CDs. For example, as does Hall et al. (2004), I exclude the banks that keep
Jumbo CDs less than 5 million dollars, the banks that did not survive the entire pre-
and post- periods and the banks that had been operating less than 5 years as of 1984.
Since Jumbo CD holders are only one out of several types of stakeholders who might
have incentives to monitor risky banks, and banks vary considerably regarding their
asset concentration, I arbitrarily chose 50 commercial banks with the largest shares
of Jumbo CDs in their total deposits as the subjects of my study.13 These banks also
have some diversity in size, which can avoid the bias in sample selection.14 Table 2.1
reports the summary statistics.
I use the interest rate spreads, as introduced in the previous section, as the risk
premia of Jumbo CDs. Specically, I subtract the risk-free interest rate, measured
by the interest rate of one-year maturity treasury bonds, from the average interest
rate of Jumbo CDs, computed as the total interest expenses on Jumbo CDs divided
by the total amount of Jumbo CDs. I then divide the nominal average interest rate
spreads by the forecasted ination rate computed with the historical data.
13The sample can easily be expanded without greatly a¤ecting the results.
14Some of the previous studies chose a very limited number of banks in their samples by focusing
on very large banks (e.g., Keely, 1990 and Ellis and Flannery, 1992).
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I choose several risk measures widely cited in literature. The ratio of non-performing
(overdue) loans to total loans is the indicator of credit risk. This ratio measures the
percentage of a loan a bank might have to write o¤ as losses. I expect the Jumbo CD
spread to go up when a bank has a higher ratio of non-performing loans. The liquidity
of bank assets is measured as the share of cash in total assets. In a general sense, a
bank with a larger amount of liquid assets is thought to be safer, since in the case of
a crisis such as a bank run, a bank with more liquid assets has more power to cope
with the situation. Therefore, I expect the bank liquidity measure to be negatively
related to risk premia on Jumbo CDs. Another risk measure widely cited in literature
is the leverage level of a bank, which is calculated as one minus the ratio of capital to
total assets. A bank with a higher leverage level is believed to be riskier. Therefore,
I expect that Jumbo CD holders would respond to an increase in the leverage of a
bank by asking for higher risk premia.
In addition to the three main risk measures mentioned above, I also examine
another two risk measures which, according to the literature, might have a prior
unclear relation with risk premia under market discipline. The rst is the ratio of
non-interest expenses to total assets, which is supposed to measure the operating
e¢ ciency of banks. Although it is generally believed that a bank with higher non-
interest expenses is less e¢ ciently operated, the high expenses may also result from
the higher cost of better services for customers. Therefore, the relationship between
non-interest expenses and risk premia might be unclear. Many studies also consider
the impact of the concentration of bank assets as assessing risk. For example, the
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real estate industry is traditionally thought to be unstable and vulnerable, and the
ratio of loans to the real estate industry to total loans is expected to be positively
related with the risk premium under market discipline. Nevertheless, some studies
(e.g., Martinez and Schmuckler, 2004) also mention that most of the real estate loans
are actually mortgages that have the assets in questions as collateral. In that sense,
loans to the real estate industry could also be considered relatively safe. The results
for this risk measure also depend on which impact is dominant.
I also have several variables, as discussed in the previous section, to control the
impact from the banksdemand for Jumbo CDs. When the return on assets (ROA)
decreases, bank managers tend to increase the return on shareholders equity by
increasing leverage, which means more demand for deposits, especially large uninsured
deposits (Jumbo CD). Therefore, the ROA is expected to be negatively related to risk
premia since increases in demand for Jumbo CDs would force banks to provide higher
risk premia to Jumbo CD holders. Since Jumbo CDs are traded nationally without
much restriction from the local customer base, the ratio of demand deposit to total
assets, as an indicator of the local customer base, would not have an impact on the
supply side of Jumbo CDs. However, when a banks assets are funded more with
demand deposits, which in general can be withdrawn at any time, bank managers
would tend to collect more Jumbo CDs to back up a banks loaning activities. In this
sense, an increase in the ratio of demand deposits to total assets might bring forth an
increase in Jumbo CD demand, which implies a positive relation between the ratio of
demand deposits to total assets and risk premiums of Jumbo CDs. Another variable
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to control for Jumbo CD demand is the banks total assets, since it is traditionally
believed that an increase in a banks assets or size would lead to growth in loaning
activity, which requires more deposits, especially deposits in large denominations such
as a Jumbo CD. As a result, I expect bank size to be positively related to Jumbo CD
premia in the sense of impact from the demand side.
Furthermore, since our estimation involves autoregressive regressions of endoge-
nous variables, I undertook the unit-root tests for all endogenous variables involved
in estimations. These tests are necessary because only if variables are stationary can
the Granger causality test be directly performed. Specically, LLC (Levin, Lin and
Chu) is a panel data unit-root test with the assumption of a common unit root, while
IPS (IM, Pesaran and Shin), Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests take into account the
cross-sectional e¤ect by combining individual unit-root tests to derive a panel-specic
result. The results show that all endogenous variables are stationary in level except
loans to the real estate industry as a share of total loans, and non-interest expense
as a share of total assets in panel B (post-FDICIA period). Nevertheless, the rst
di¤erence of these two non-stationary variables turns out to be stationary in terms
of all four types of tests. Therefore, in the dynamic panel data context, our im-
plementation of Granger causality tests with the application of Arellano and Bond
GMM estimators that take the rst di¤erence of all variables, appropriately suits our
purpose.
In order to examine the magnitude and timeliness of market discipline from Jumbo
CD holders, I apply the concept of Granger causality (Granger, 1969) to test whether
30
T
ab
le
2.
2:
R
es
u
lt
s
of
U
n
it
R
oo
t
T
es
ts
(P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y*
*o
f
A
cc
ep
ta
nc
e
of
th
e
N
ul
l
H
yp
ot
he
si
s
of
th
e
U
ni
t
R
oo
t)
P
an
el
A
:
P
re
-F
D
IC
IA
(1
98
5:
1
to
19
89
:4
)
Sp
re
ad
O
ve
rd
ue
L
iq
ui
di
ty
L
ev
er
ag
e
R
ea
l
E
st
at
e
N
on
-I
nt
er
es
t
L
L
C
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
IP
S
0.
00
0
0.
02
7
0.
00
0
0.
03
3
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
A
D
F
0.
00
0
0.
00
3
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
3
0.
00
0
P
P
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
01
3
0.
00
0
P
an
el
B
:
P
os
t-
F
D
IC
IA
(1
99
2:
1
to
19
96
:4
)
Sp
re
ad
O
ve
rd
ue
L
iq
ui
di
ty
L
ev
er
ag
e
R
ea
l
E
st
at
e
R
ea
l
E
st
at
e_
1
N
on
-I
nt
er
es
t
N
on
-i
nt
er
es
t_
1
L
L
C
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
04
5
0.
00
0
1.
00
0
0.
00
0
IP
S
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
25
2
0.
00
0
0.
56
7
0.
00
0
A
D
F
0.
00
4
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
32
5
0.
00
0
0.
18
2
0.
00
0
P
P
0.
06
9
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
01
3
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
nt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
p
an
el
d
at
a
u
n
it
ro
ot
te
st
s.
T
h
e
te
st
s
ar
e
n
ec
es
sa
ry
b
ec
au
se
on
ly
if
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
st
at
io
n
ar
y
ca
n
th
e
G
ra
n
ge
r
C
au
sa
li
ty
te
st
b
e
d
ir
ec
tl
y
p
er
fo
rm
ed
.
I
im
p
le
m
en
te
d
fo
u
r
ty
p
es
of
u
n
it
ro
ot
te
st
s
in
w
h
ic
h
L
L
C
(
L
ev
in
,
L
in
an
d
C
hu
)
as
su
m
es
co
m
m
on
u
n
it
ro
ot
p
ro
ce
ss
es
,
w
h
il
e
IP
S
(I
m
,
P
es
ar
an
an
d
S
h
in
),
A
D
F
(
A
D
F
-
F
is
h
er
)
an
d
P
P
(P
P
-
F
is
h
er
)
as
su
m
e
in
d
iv
id
u
al
u
n
it
ro
ot
p
ro
ce
ss
es
.
T
h
e
re
su
lt
s
sh
ow
th
at
al
l
en
d
og
en
ou
s
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
st
at
io
n
ar
y
in
le
ve
l
ex
ce
p
t
lo
an
s
to
th
e
re
al
es
ta
te
in
d
u
st
ry
as
a
sh
ar
e
of
to
ta
l
lo
an
s
an
d
n
on
-i
nt
er
es
t
ex
p
en
se
as
sh
ar
e
of
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
in
p
an
el
B
(p
os
t-
F
D
IC
IA
p
er
io
d
).
N
ev
er
th
el
es
s,
th
e

rs
t
or
d
er
d
i¤
er
en
ce
of
R
ea
l
E
st
at
e
an
d
N
on
-I
nt
er
es
t
tu
rn
ou
t
to
b
e
st
at
io
n
ar
y
in
te
rm
s
of
al
l
fo
u
r
ty
p
es
of
te
st
s.
T
h
er
ef
or
e,
in
th
e
d
yn
am
ic
p
an
el
d
at
a
co
nt
ex
t,
ou
r
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
on
of
G
ra
n
ge
r
C
au
sa
li
ty
te
st
s
w
it
h
th
e
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
of
A
re
ll
an
o
an
d
B
on
d
G
M
M
es
ti
m
at
or
s,
w
h
ic
h
ta
ke

rs
t
d
i¤
er
en
ce
of
al
l
va
ri
ab
le
s,
su
it
s
ou
r
p
u
rp
os
e.
**
N
ot
e:
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
ie
s
fo
r
F
is
h
er
te
st
s
ar
e
co
m
p
u
te
d
u
si
n
g
an
as
ym
p
to
ti
c
C
h
i-
sq
u
ar
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
.
A
ll
ot
h
er
te
st
s
as
su
m
e
as
ym
p
to
ti
c
n
or
m
al
it
y
31
bank risk measures systematically change before a change of risk premia requested
by Jumbo CD holders. At the same time, I also employ the reverse test to examine
whether changes in risk premia paid by banks can predict the changes in bank risk
measures so that I can capture the e¤ectiveness of Jumbo CD holdersmarket dis-
cipline in the sense of banks"self-correction" behavior. Specically, I estimate the
following regressions for the pre-FDICIA and the post-FDICIA windows:
Pi;t =
3X
j=1
1;jPi;t j +
3X
j=1
1:jSi;t j +  1Xi;t + 1;i + 1;t + 1;i;t ; (1)
Si;t =
3X
j=1
2;jPi;t j +
3X
j=1
2;jSi;t j +  2Xi;t + 2;i + 2;t + 2;i;t : (2)
Where Pi;t is the risk premium of Jumbo-CDs for bank i at time t, Si;t is the
accounting data-based bank risk measure for bank i at time t; Xi;t is bank-specic
variables controlling for the demand side e¤ect for bank i at time t;15 i is the omit-
ted bank-specic xed e¤ect for a bank; t is a time e¤ect to account for trending
behavior in the system variables; and "i;t is a random disturbance with a distribu-
tion approximating the normal. The specication of (1) and (2) assumes that error
terms are orthogonal to xed time e¤ects and controlling variables as well as lagged
15As previously discussed, we test the causality relation between the bank risk and risk premium
for each risk measure, respectively.
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values of the endogenous variables. Other standard assumptions include that the
errors have positive variance and are uncorrelated across cross-sectional units and
time. As pointed out in econometric literature (e.g., Nickell 1981), the least squares
dummy variable (LSDV) estimator could produce biased coe¢ cients when applied to
equations with lagged values of the dependent variable and xed e¤ects in a data set
with a small time dimension. In order to remove the xed e¤ect, I can di¤erence all
variables in the level. The basic regression equations become:
Pi;t   Pi;t 1 =
3X
j=1
1;j(Pi;t j   Pi;t j 1) +
3X
j=1
1;j(Si;t j   Si;t j 1)
+ 1(Xi;t  Xi;t 1) + (1;t   1;t 1) + (1;i;t   1;i;t 1); 3)
Si;t   Si;t 1 =
3X
j=1
2;j(Pi;t j   Pi;t j 1) +
3X
j=1
2;j(Si;t j   Si;t j 1)
+ 2(Xi;t  Xi;t 1) + (2;t   2;t 1) + (2;i;t   2;i;t 1): (4)
Although regressions such as (3) and (4) are free of a cross-sectional xed e¤ect,
there are possible correlation between new error terms and lags of endogenous vari-
ables that will lead to bias in least square regressions. Arellano and Bond (1991)
tackle this problem by proposing a linear instrumental variables technique that uses
the predetermined lags of the endogenous system variables as instruments to exploit a
large set of over-identifying restrictions so as to attain consistent coe¢ cient estimates.
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If I indicate the rst di¤erences of P , S ,X ,  and as P , S and  , the regression
specications with Arellano and Bonds method have the form:
P i;t =
3X
j=1
1;jP i;t j +
3X
j=1
1;jSi;t j +  1X i;t + 1;t + 1;i;t ; (5)
Si;t =
3X
j=1
2;jP i;t j +
3X
j=1
2;jSi;t j +  2X i;t + 2;t + 2;i;t : (6)
Where the errors of the transformed equations satisfy the orthogonality conditions:
E

P i;si;t

= E

Si;si;t

= 0 where s < (t  1):
Since I am particularly interested in Granger causality patterns among those en-
dogenous variables, I also construct an F-test for block exclusion by calculating the
di¤erence in criterion functions of restricted and unrestricted models so as to test
whether including a number of lags for one variable could signicantly improve the
predictive power of the regression.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the regressions taking the form
of equation 5, which aims to examine whether changes in each risk measure have
signicant predictive power on changes in risk premia.
The results are reported for each regression regarding the predictive power of
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each risk measure. For each regression, the sum of the coe¢ cients of all lags of the
risk measure is reported to indicate the aggregate magnitude of the predictive power
of each risk measure. The results of an F-test with the null hypothesis that the
coe¢ cients of all lags of risk measures are equal to zero are also reported to indicate
the statistical signicance of the risk measures predictive power. The coe¢ cients
of control variables are also reported. In addition, I run a Sargan test for each
regression to examine the validity of the instrumental variables. The null hypothesis
of the Sargan test is that instrumental variables are su¢ ciently uncorrelated with
the residuals and are therefore acceptable as instruments. Since the results of the
Sargan test for all regressions are insignicant, and thus the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected, the instrumental variables applied in our regressions seem valid.
The most important results from these and subsequent tables concern the signs
and statistical signicance of aggregate coe¢ cients of all lagged risk measure variables,
along with the F-statistic, for the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of all lagged risk
measure variables are jointly equal to zero. (I report the associated P-values in
parentheses.) These two results show the aggregate predictive power of the specic
risk measure. By comparing those results for the same risk measure in two time
periods (pre-FDICIA and post-FDICIA), I can capture the e¤ect of the FDICIA on
the predictive power of this risk measure, which indicates the existence and timeliness
of Jumbo CD holdersmarket discipline. For the share of overdue loans, it seems that
there was no timely reaction from Jumbo CD holders before the FDICIA, since I
cannot reject the hypothesis that all the coe¢ cients of the lagged share of overdue
36
loans are jointly equal to zero. However, after the FDICIA was enacted, the aggregate
coe¢ cient turned positive (0.059), which suggests that an increase in the share of
overdue loans would lead to an increase in the risk premium Jumbo CD holders
demand. The signicance of the F-statistic at 1% indicates that their reaction was
timely. Therefore, market discipline from Jumbo CD holders was reinforced by the
FDICIA in respect to Jumbo-CD holdersreaction to increases in the share of overdue
loans.
Another risk measure often referred to in the literature is a banks leverage level
since high leverage is commonly considered an indicator of high default risk. The
results indicate that the aggregate coe¢ cients for both periods have positive signs,
and the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients for all lagged variables is jointly equal to
zero is rejected for both periods as well. This observation shows that Jumbo CD
holders react to an increase in banksleverage levels by requesting a higher risk premia
in both periods, which indicates the existence and timeliness of market discipline.
Furthermore, the fact that the magnitude of the aggregate coe¢ cient, which increased
from the pre-FDICIA period to the post-FDICIA period, also support our hypothesis
that market discipline was improved by the enactment of the FDICIA.
A bank with high liquidity is considered to be healthy since it is more able to
accommodate unexpected withdrawals. Becasue I cannot reject the hypothesis that
all the coe¢ cients of lagged variables are jointly equal to zero for the pre-FDICIA
period, it seems that Jumbo CD holders did not react opportunely to a decrease
in bank liquidity by asking for a higher risk premium. Nevertheless, as with the
37
share of nonperforming loans, the reaction of Jumbo CD holders changed in becoming
signicant after the FDICIA was enacted. We can see this result in that the aggregate
coe¢ cient is negative, which indicates that an increase in banksliquidity level could
predict a decrease in the risk premia Jumbo CD holders demand. The fact that the
F-statistic is signicant at the 1% level indicates that the prediction is timely as well.
As for the risk measure capturing the default risk coming from asset concentration,
the share of loans to the real estate industry and the signs of the aggregate coe¢ cient
of the share of loans to the real estate industry are negative in both the pre-FDICIA
and post-FDICIA periods. This outcome seems to support the ndings of studies
such as Martinez and Schmuckler (2004) that consider banks with more loans to real
estate as relatively healthier, since almost all loans to the real estate industry are
mortgages, which have the real estate itself as collateral. However, the fact that the
hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of all lagged variables are jointly equal to zero cannot
be rejected in either period suggests that the Jumbo CD holdersreaction was not
timely in a statistical sense. One possible explanation for this insignicant result is
that Jumbo CD holders do not have a consensus in the risk implied in loans to the
real estate industry.
Similarly to the share of loans to real estate industry, the ratio of non-interest
expense is also a controversial risk measure. As discussed in the previous section,
there are two opinions regarding the implications of this risk measure. The negative
signs of the aggregate coe¢ cients for both periods suggest that a large share of non-
interest expense is more likely to be a good sign for a banks operating e¢ ciency,
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such as better customer service. Another noteworthy result is that the hypothesis
that coe¢ cients for all the lagged ratios of non-interest expense are jointly equal to
zero cannot be rejected for the post-FDICIA but was rejected for the pre-FDICIA
period. This situation suggests that the Jumbo CD holdersreaction to change in
the banksoperating e¢ ciency became less timely after the FDICIA took e¤ect. This
observation indicates that uninsured depositors such as Jumbo-CD holders have relied
less on operating e¢ ciency to monitor banksrisk-taking behaviors since the FDICIA
was enacted.
Finally, note that those variables controlling for the demand side e¤ect perform
consistently with my expectation: The return on assets obtains a negative coe¢ cient,
which indicates a negative relation between ROA and the demand for deposits, es-
pecially Jumbo CDs; the coe¢ cients of the share of demand deposits obtain positive
signs, which is consistent with our expectation that banks with a larger share of de-
mand deposits would like to collect more Jumbo CDs; and positive coe¢ cients of total
bank assets also show evidence of a positive relation between the growth of bank size
and the demand of uninsured deposits such as Jumbo CDs.
The examination of two-way Granger causality between risk premia and risk mea-
sures provides us with tools not only to test the existence of market discipline by
examining the predictive power of risk measures on changes in risk premia. It also al-
lows us to test the e¤ectiveness of market discipline by examining the predictive power
of changes in risk premia on changes in risk measures to see whether the Jumbo-CD
holdersmonitoring could prevent banks from excessive risk-taking behavior. Table
39
4 reports the results of regressions taking the form of equation 6 to achieve this goal.
The instrumental variables work well since the null hypothesis of the Sargan test
that instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the residuals cannot be rejected for
any of the regressions, and thus are acceptable instrumental variables. The negative
sign of the aggregate coe¢ cients for nonperforming loans as a share of total loans
shows that bank managements do make e¤orts to mitigate their default risk when
Jumbo-CD holders ask for higher risk premia. Moreover, the results of the F-test
show that the null hypothesis that coe¢ cients for all lagged risk premia are equal to
zero is rejected for both periods although there is a slight decrease in the signicance
after the FDICIA took e¤ect. Therefore, banksrisk-taking behavior has involved a
timely response to changes in risk premia during both the pre-FDICIA period and
post-FDICIA period in respect to the ratio of nonperforming loans. In addition, the
magnitude of the coe¢ cients and F-statistics barely changed after the FDICIA, which
suggests that the sensitivity of banksrisk-taking behavior to changes in risk premia
was not much impacted by the enactment of the FDICIA.
The ways in which banksleverage levels responded to changes in the requested risk
premia seems to have signicantly changed after the FDICIA was enacted. During
the period when the FDICIA was not in force, the aggregate coe¢ cient of lagged
risk premia was positive, which suggests that banks tended to raise the leverage
level when Jumbo CD holders asked for higher risk premia. This outcome seems
contrary to how market discipline is supposed to work. Nevertheless, taking into
account the severe moral hazard problems of bank management in the late 80s as
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depicted in many studies (e.g., Osborne and Lee, 2001), it is not surprising at all to
observe a positive relation between a banks risk taking behavior and an increase in
risk premia. In contrast, our regression results for the post-FDICIA period show an
opposite situation in which banksleverage levels respond negatively to an increase
in risk premia. Also, the signicance of the F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis
that all coe¢ cients for lagged risk premia are jointly equal to zero, which suggests
that the response is timely as well as negative. The di¤erence in the results of two
periods indicates that the e¤ectivenessof the Jumbo CD holdersmarket discipline
was signicantly improved by the enactment of the FDICIA.
In the case of liquidity, the results also show a signicant improvement (but not
as drastic as that involving bank leverage levels) in the e¤ectivenessof Jumbo CD
holdersmarket discipline: The aggregate coe¢ cients are positive for both periods,
indicating a positive relation between a change in risk premium and the liquidity
of bank assets. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that all lagged risk premia jointly
have zero coe¢ cients is rejected only for the post-FDICIA period, which shows that
the change in the risk premia requested by Jumbo CD holders became much more
timelyafter the FDICIA took e¤ect.
As discussed in the previous section, the share of loans to the real estate industry
and the share of non-interest expenses are two controversial risk measures since there
could be two o¤setting e¤ects associated with these measures. Regressions regarding
the predictive power of these two risk measures show that Jumbo CD holders might
not have a consensus on the understanding of these two risk measures, and the mis-
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understanding could lead to insignicant predictive power of changes in risk premia
on these two risk measures.
Nevertheless, the study of the banksresponse to changes in risk premia they must
pay by adjusting their risk-taking behavior might help us get a clearer idea of how
these two risk measures are related to the banksrisk-taking behavior. As for the share
of loans that go to the real estate industry, the results show that, in the pre-FDICIA
period, when the risk premia that banks must pay Jumbo CD holders go up, banks
tend to increase the concentration of their assets on loans to the real estate industry.
In the post-FDICIA period, they tend to decrease the share of loans to the real estate
industry in the same situation. Considering the likelihood of moral hazard in the pre-
FDICIA period, the change of signs of aggregate coe¢ cients from positive to negative
suggests that, from the perspective of bank management, the loans to the real estate
industry tend to raise default risk. Bank management would thereby reduce the share
of loans to the real estate industry to lower the risk premia Jumbo CD holders ask
for if there were a self-correction response of banks or else e¤ectiveness in the
Jumbo CD holdersmarket discipline. However, the insignicance of F-statistics for
both periods cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of all lagged risk
premia are jointly equal to zero. Therefore, there is still mixed behavior from the side
of bank management even following the FDICIA enactment, although there seems to
be a slight improvement in the banksself-correctionresponse to the signals sent
by increases in risk premia.
Another noteworthy result concerns the share of non-interest expense. The exam-
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ination of the predictive power of this risk measure on changes in risk premia shows
that uninsured depositors such as Jumbo CD holders counted less on non-interest
expense as an indicator of banksrisk-taking behavior in the post-FDICIA period,
while they did respond negatively to increases in the share of non-interest expense
before the FDICIA took e¤ect. The examination of the banksself-correctionbe-
havior or the predictive power of changes in risk premia on changes in the share of
non-interest expenses shows consistent results for the pre-FDICIA period. The ag-
gregate coe¢ cient turned out to be positive, which means that the banks tended to
raise their non-interest expense for purposes such as better customer service when
the requested risk premia went up. After the FDICIA was enacted, banks seem to be
more inclined to lower their non-interest expense when risk premia increased. This
change suggests that, from the perspective of bank management, the share of non-
interest expense became more indicative of the ine¢ ciency of operation than it was
before the FDICIAs enactment.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, I explore from a new perspective the impact of the enactment of
the FDICIA on market discipline. I employ the two-sided Granger causality test to
examine the dynamic relation between risk measures and risk premia so that I can
elucidate the impact of the FDICIA on the timelinessand e¤ectivenessof market
discipline by testing the change in predictive power among accounting risk measures
and risk premia.
The rst part of our main results concerns the examination of the predictive power
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of the change in risk measures on the change in risk premia for each accounting risk
ratio in both the pre-FDICIA period and the post-FDICIA period. This segment
of results shows that market discipline from Jumbo CD holders was signicantly
reinforced by the FDICIA with respect to the Jumbo CD holdersreaction to increases
in the share of overdue loans, leverage level and liquidity. Nevertheless, I obtained
mixed results for controversial risk measures such as the share of loans to the real
estate industry and the share of non-interest expense. The results suggest that Jumbo
CD holders do not rely on the share of loans to the real estate industry in evaluating
banks risk-taking behavior (the insignicance of F-statistics). A slight majority
of Jumbo CD holders seem to believe that loans to real estate, which usually are
well-collateralized, might actually benet the banksoverall soundness. The results
also show that, in the period of the pre-FDICIA, most Jumbo CD holders believed
that non-interest expense was closely related to improvements in operating e¢ ciency
such as better customer service. In depending considerably on this accounting ratio
after the FDICIA was enacted, more Jumbo CD holders thought of this ratio as an
indicator of operating ine¢ ciency. The misunderstanding among Jumbo CD holders
made this accounting ratio lose its predictive power for the change in risk premia
after the FDICIA took e¤ect.
The other part of the main results presents the impact of the FDICIA on the
predictive power of changes in risk premia on changes in accounting risk measures,
which we refer to as the self-correctionbehavior of bank management or the e¤ec-
tivenessof market discipline. The results show that bank managements make e¤orts
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to lower the ratio of non-performing loans to all loans when Jumbo CD holders ask for
higher risk premia both before and after the FDICIA enactment. Nevertheless, bank
managements seemed to take advantage of forbearance policies before the FDICIA
was enacted. They even raised their leverage level to take on more risk with the hope
of getting a higher return to cover the increased costs when uninsured depositors such
as Jumbo CD holders asked for higher risk premia. In contrast, our results suggest
a signicant improvement after the FDICIA took e¤ect, since in the post-FDICIA
period the banksleverage level started to respond negatively to an increase in risk
premia. In addition, this improvement in banksself-correction responses is also
found in results regarding the risk measure of liquidity.
In sum, after controlling for impacts from the demand side of the Jumbo CDs
on risk premia and employing cross-sectional time-series methodologies, I obtained
a clearer picture of the dynamic relation between accounting risk measures and risk
premia than did previous studies. I nd clear evidence that both the timeliness
(the predictive power of changes in risk measures on changes in risk premia) and
e¤ectiveness (the predictive power of changes in risk premia on changes in risk
measures) of market discipline from uninsured depositors such as Jumbo CD holders
were signicantly improved by the enactment of the FDICIA. Therefore, the improved
regulatory environment provided by the FDICIA has successfully revived incentives
for uninsured depositors to monitor nancial institutionsdefault risk, and has mo-
tivated nancial institutions to be more responsive to market disciplines through
self-correction.
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CHAPTER III
INTERSTATE BRANCHING MODE CHOICE AND BRANCH
PERFORMANCE OUTCOME
1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed fundamental deregulation in the American bank-
ing industry, especially in respect to branching authority. One of the most important
deregulations on branching came with the passage of the RiegleNeal Interstate Bank-
ing and Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994. This Act enabled banking organizations to
increase the size and reach of their operations by interstate branching. However, the
Riegle-Neal Act treats two modes of interstate branching in distinct ways. On one
hand, the Act requires state governments to generally allow out-of-state banks to op-
erate within their states through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, it still
permits each state the right to determine whether to allow an out-ofstate bank to
branch into the state via de novo branching. That is to say, Riegle-Neal Act permits
interstate branching through de novo branching (establishing new o¢ ces without an
acquisition) only if the host state enacts legislation that expressly permits it. By the
beginning of 1997, which was the "trigger year" of the Riegle-Neal Act, nine states
in addition to the District of Columbia allowed de novo interstate branching. Only
eight, however, allowed de novo interstate branching on a reciprocal basis.16
16These 9 states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Virginia.
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After the Riegle-Neal Act had been in e¤ect for about 10 years, the issue of de
novo interstate branching was again brought forth: For several years, the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act has been in debate in Congress. It proposes to remove
the requirement that states must opt-in to de novo interstate branching and would
thereby allow banks to freely establish de novo branches nationwide.
The natural questions to ask are why has Congress been more cautious about the
provision on de novo interstate branching than about interstate branching via M&A?
Why have state governments been concerned with the de novo interstate branching
entry of out-of-state banks, even when there are no more restrictions on the alterna-
tive mode of interstate branching (M&A)? The answers to these questions lie in the
di¤erence in impact of these two modes of interstate branching.
The existing literature on interstate branching usually examines the entire impact
of banksbranching activities without di¤erentiating between the e¤ects of two dif-
ferent modes of interstate branching (e.g., Hughes et al., 1996 and Berger and De
Young, 2000). Some of these studies focus on the impact of interstate branching
on the competition or e¢ ciency of local banking markets. DeYoung, et al. (1997)
argue that interstate competition in banking markets should result in gains in cost
e¢ ciency. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) nd that state branching deregulation im-
proved banking e¢ ciency and led to lower interest rates for borrowers and higher
economic growth. Other authors claim that interstate branching activities increase
economic stability and improve large-scale nancing (Calomiris, 1995). Some other
studies examine the aggregate impact of interstate branching on the performance of
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an MBHC (multiple bank holding company). For instance, Tirtiroglu and Daniels
(2005) nd that de novo branching deregulations have a negative long-run e¤ect on
banksproductivity growth.
The main purpose of restrictions on market entry is to protect the degree of
competition of the local markets and the market share of in-market rms. In the
scenario of the banking industry, those regulations aim to keep the local markets
from being dominated by large out-of-state banks, and to protect in-state banks
from losing signicant market shares to branches of out-of-state banks, due to being
outperformed by new branches.
Giedeman (2004)s ndings based on data from more than seven hundred cities/
local markets indicate that the establishment of de novo interstate branches did not
signicantly increase local banking market concentration. Although Geidemans re-
sults could alleviate some concerns about de novo interstate branching, those results
still cannot directly answer the question regarding the di¤erent policies on those two
interstate branching modes: How do the de novo branches of out-of-state banks and
branches acquired by out-of-state banks di¤er in performance?
Instead of testing whether interstate branching improved/harmed the banking
e¢ ciency or competition in the local market as a whole, this study proposes to ex-
amine the di¤erence in those two modes of interstate branching (de novo branching
v.s. mergers and acquisitions) in the sense of performance outcome of the choice of
interstate branching mode by each entrant bank. The interstate branching activities
in states which have allowed interstate branching provide a natural experiment for us
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to examine how the choice of interstate branching mode could a¤ect the performance
of branches. For banking regulators and supervisors, this study could help clarify
whether the concerns about free de novo branching are warranted. In addition, our
study could also contribute to strategic decisions about the right mode of interstate
branching by examining the performance outcome of the choice of interstate branching
mode by entrant commercial banks.
The key issue in examining the performance outcome of the interstate branching
mode choice in local markets is the problem of endogeneity. The problem lies in the
fact that the bank managements choice of branching mode is endogenous to their ex-
pected performance outcome. Statistical analysis that does not take into account the
decision makers expectation of performance outcome with respect to the mode choice
might su¤er from biased coe¢ cient estimates. Note that the fundamental question
to ask when assessing whether a bank management made the right decision on the
interstate branching mode is: Would branches of a multi-market bank have achieved a
higher capacity of acquiring market shares, collecting deposits and setting up branches
if the management had chosen the alternative mode of interstate branching? We cant
answer this question accurately, however, by simply comparing performance outcomes
of branches categorized by the mode of interstate branching, since the observed out-
comes may not correspond to the counterfactual performance level of interest. For
example, banks choosing to branch via mergers and acquisitions might have some
particular production capability that makes this choice highly protable, while banks
choosing de novo branching might not have this production capability in the rst
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place. As a result, in order to capture the impact of mode choice on performance,
we must exclude the impacts from factors endogenous to choice decision, such as the
di¤erence in production capability.
Thanks to Nobel Prize Laureate Heckmans contribution, econometric techniques
to correct endogeneity lying in discrete strategy choices have been developed and
considerably improved. The key point of the estimation approach in allowing for
endogeneity is to deal with the unobservable variables that a¤ect both performance
outcomes and the strategic choice, since it is generally unrealistic to include all factors
a¤ecting performance and strategy choice in control variables in regression. The
problem of endogeneity in the scenario of interstate branching and the approach to
xing it will be discussed in detail in the latter part of this paper.
The following sections are arranged as follows. Section 2 summarizes the previous
literature. The estimation method is described in section 3. Section 4 discusses
the variables and associated hypotheses. Data sources and summary description are
presented in section 5. Section 6 reports results and includes discussion. Concluding
remarks are stated in section 7.
2 Literature Review
Expansion across state borders is a necessary step for a banks growth and devel-
opment. In this sense, a banks entry into a new market means potential diversity
in geography as well as economy of scale. Theories predict that entry is prone to
occur when there is strong prospect of future prots. Empirical works nd that prof-
itability, concentration and market growth are the primary factors determining entry.
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Nevertheless, another critical issue about entering a geographically new market is
the choice of the mode of branching. The closest concept to which the interstate
branching mode can be related is the entry mode,since entrant banksinterstate
branching activities are actually a means of entering new markets. Generally speak-
ing, the modes of entry can be divided into two groups: non-equity entry modes
(e.g., licensing) and equity-based entry modes (e.g., joint ventures and wholly owned
subsidiaries) (Caves, 1986). However, in the scenario of the U.S. banking industry,
all entries into new markets take the form of equity-based entry modes. If an equity-
based mode of entry into a new market is then chosen, the issue of whether to acquire
an existing local bank (interstate branching via M&A) or to set up completely new
branches (interstate branching via de novo branching) must be decided.
In the eld of industry organization, Giltert and Newbery (1992) and McCardle
and Viswanathan (1994) o¤er two major theoretical papers on the choice of the equity-
based mode of entry: de novo or M&A. Both studies consider strategic factors as well
as nancial motivations involved in the entrantschoice of entry mode. Giltert and
Newbery (1992) set up a Nash-Cournot oligopoly model to study the build or buy
decision of a potential entrant. Although acquiring an existent bank could bring
about a high premium cost, this method has advantages in gaining from the more
e¢ cient allocation of assets and risk diversication. Giltert and Newbery claim that
entry via M&A may be preferred to de novo entry for various other reasons. First,
entry via M&A could be chosen over de novo entry to avoid the high entry barrier
and the associated xed cost. Second, as for the aspects of future protability, when
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the number of incumbents in the market is close to the free-entrymarket or the
free-entrynumber of the market is low, the prot that an entrant is able to obtain
via the de novo entry could be much lower than entry via M&A, since the increase
of the number of competitors would signicantly raise the degree of competition in
the market and drag down the surplus. In addition, Gilbert and Newbery take into
account the strategic behavior of entrants and claim that entrants prefer entry via
M&A to de novo entry when they have strong bargaining power in bidding for M&A.
According to Giltert and Newbery, the credibility of the entry is one crucial factor
in determining of the bargaining power. For example, if the potential entrant has
subsidiaries in more markets, the incumbents are more threatened by the possible
direct entry and are prone to set a lower reservation price for M&A or a smaller share
of post-M&A prots.
McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) extend the Giltert and Newbery (1992) model
from the Nash-Cournot symmetric oligopoly model with complete information to the
asymmetric information Cournot oligopoly model. Specically, there are two types of
potential entrants: Entrants with a high entry cost and those with a low entry cost. At
the same time, incumbents are uncertain about the true type of a potential entrant.
The optimal sequential equilibrium could, for example, consist of pooling equilibrium
or separating equilibrium or both. In pooling equilibrium, both types of entrants bid
for incumbents and no type information is revealed. In separating equilibrium, the
low entry cost entrants choose de novo branching and high entry cost entrants choose
interstate branching via M&A, thus revealing their type to incumbents. McCardle and
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Viswanathan derive the conditions for which equilibrium would hold and the entrants
preference for targets on condition that they do choose to enter via M&A based on
a bargaining game between entrants and incumbents. In separating equilibrium, the
model predicts that the choice of targets is a trade-o¤ between the e¢ ciency gains
of taking over the ine¢ cient incumbents and the lower prots due to the inferior
competitive strength of ine¢ cient incumbents. Particularly, when the entrant is more
e¢ cient than at least one of the incumbents, the e¢ cient gains could outweigh the
competitive e¤ect so that the ine¢ cient incumbents are more likely to be targeted.
In pooling equilibrium, the choice of targets is a trade-o¤ between e¢ cient gains
and bargaining power, since more e¢ cient incumbents would be more a¤ected by
direct entry so that they have less bargaining power in negotiation with the entrants.
Consequently, if the entrant is less e¢ cient than incumbents, bargaining factors would
dominate and he would be more likely to target e¢ cient incumbents.
Moreover, in the eld of international economics, there are many papers that
examine the issue of choosing an equity-based mode of entry into foreign markets:
Greeneld investment or M&A. For example, Buckley and Casson (1998) analyze the
choice between these two entry modes. One of their important conclusions is that
the market structure as well as the degree of competition in the market both have
a crucial impact on the entry mode choice. They nd that the existence of a high
cost of competition associated with high monopoly rents makes acquisition preferred
to greeneld investment. At the same time, an entrants highly specic production
technology might result in higher adaptation costs so as to discourage acquisition and
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to favor greeneld investment. Gorg (2000) analyzes the impact of market structure
on choice between greeneld investment and acquisition in a Cournot-type setting.
He shows that, although in general acquisition may be the preferred mode of entry,
Greeneld investment may be a preferred choice to avoid high adaptation costs.
Harzing (2002) proposes to examine the determinants of entry mode choice from
the aspect of corporate-level strategy rather than the business unit strategy only.
Specically, she argues that a rms international strategy as a whole would play a
critical role in determining the mode of entry into a new market: Firms with global
strategies tend to integrate and rationalize their production to produce standardized
products in a cost-e¢ cient manner. Therefore, they care less about responsiveness to
the local market and would prefer de novo entry over M&A entry. Similarly, rms with
multi-market strategies tend to maximize their aggregate performance by maximizing
their performance in each market so that they would want their subsidiaries to be
responsive to the local market. M&A would therefore be a better choice in entering a
new market. In the scenario of the U.S. banking industry, which could be taken as a
miniature of the international market, many of the ndings about the determinants of
entry mode choice could be tested in our study of banksinterstate branching modes.
We will elaborate on this projection when we discuss variables and hypotheses.
Although there are quite a few empirical papers on the impact of foreign entry
mode decisions on rm performance (e.g., Lu and Beamish, 2001, Harzing 2002 and
Brouthers and Nakos, 2004) , there are few empirical works explicitly examining the
determinants of commercial bankschoice of interstate branching mode or the impact
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of this choice on branch performance. Although some papers did nd that M&A was
actually a frequently preferable alternative entry mode to direct investment, we note
that this outcome might actually stem from the regulation restrictions.
In addition, several papers studying the relation between de novo entry and M&A
activities o¤er the perspective that M&A might be a determinant factor of de novo
entry rather than a choice between these two entry modes. Seeling and Critcheld
(2003) and Berger, Bonime, Goldberg and White (2004) present two major papers
on the impact of M&A activities on de novo entry in the banking industry. In both
these two papers, the authors dene entry into the banking industry as setting up a
new charter. They nd that M&A activities, especially in-market M&A, as well as
factors such as protability, concentration and market growth, are positively related
to de novo entry. In contrast, my study focuses more on bankschoices of how multi-
state commercial banks branch into new markets rather than on their setting up new
charters.
From the above literature review, we can see that although interstate banking
has become a booming activity, and two modes of interstate branching, de novo
branching and M&A, have also caught signicant attention from regulators and bank
management since the fundamental banking deregulation, little is actually known of
how banks make their interstate branching mode choice and how the choices a¤ect
branchesperformance in new markets they enter. This study could contribute to
the literature by applying industrial organization theories and strategic management
theories to empirical analysis of the choice of banksinterstate branching mode and
56
its impact on branch performance in new markets. The banking industry provides an
ideal laboratory for examining this issue. The products of banks are relatively homo-
geneous, and geographically segmented markets vary in demographic and economic
characteristics that enable researchers to test predictions of theoretical models under
di¤erent conditions. In addition, after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, banks gained
much more freedom in the choice of interstate banking mode, especially for those
states with an interstate branching policy, so that their choices of interstate branch-
ing mode are primarily based on prot-maximization rather than regulation limits,
which matches the assumptions of theoretical models.
Specically, this study tries to answer several questions regarding potential entrant
banksinterstate branching strategies: What are the determinants of banksinterstate
branching modes? What is the e¤ect of the choice of interstate branching mode
on performance outcomes? Could the banks be better o¤ choosing the alternative
mode of interstate branching? Here, de novo branching refers to establishing new
branches in a target market, while interstate branching via M&A means acquiring or
consolidating with any incumbent bank.
3 Estimation Method
In the previous section, we mentioned the problem of endogeneity lying in banks
self-selection in choosing the interstate branching mode, which is also the common
caveat in many empirical studies on this subject. In this analysis, a two-step Heckman
regression is employed to deal with endogeneity.
First of all, we present a binary strategy set for the scenario of branching mode
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{S0;S1} where S0 stands for interstate branching via mergers and acquisitions and
S1stands for de novo branching. We denote the performance of entrants as M .17
Accordingly,M0 stands for the performance outcome when S0 is chosen andM1 stands
for the performance outcome when S1 is chosen. As previously discussed, the strategic
question concerning us is: How could the entrantsperformance have been improved
had the commercial bank chosen the alternative mode of interstate branching, which
is equivalent to M1 M0. This di¤erence is called treatment e¤ect or strategy e¤ect
according to literature on management strategy (e.g., Rubin 1974 and 1978).
An apparent di¢ culty in estimating this strategy e¤ect is that we can only observe
one of these two performance outcomes for any particular bank. We divide the sample
into two subsamples: banks choosing the mode of M&A and banks choosing the mode
of de novo branching. Therefore, for each group of banks, we need to nd an estimate
of what their performance might have been had they chosen the alternative mode of
interstate branching. That is to say, we want to estimate the expected counterfactual
performance outcomes E(M0jS1) and E(M1jS0) for the two groups of banks respec-
tively. However, the simple univariate regression such as Mi = Si + "i, where "i is
assumed to follow normal distribution, can only provide the estimates of E(M0jS0)
and E(M1jS1) .It is easy to see that development when there are factors a¤ecting
both the performance and the choice of branching mode, E(M0jS0) 6= E(M0jS1)and
E(M1jS1) 6= E(M1jS0). For example, if large banks tend to choose to interstate
branch via M&A and tend to have a higher capability to enlarge market shares as
17In this study,M represents an entrant banks capabilities of enlarging the market share, increas-
ing the number of branches and collecting deposits.
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well, the mean performance of the branches of banks choosing the mode of M&A
actually reects both the direct impact of the branching mode on performance and
the fact that branches of large banks tend to have higher capabilities to enlarge the
market share compared with branches of smaller banks.
However, if we could observe all factors a¤ecting both performance outcomes
and choice of branching modes, including all these factors, denoted as X; as control
variables in the simple regression represented above, we could provide an unbiased
estimation of the strategy e¤ect, since in this case, E(M0jS0; X) = E(M0jS1;X) and
E(M1jS1; X) = E(M1jS0; X). The modied regression can be written as follows:
Mi = Si +Xi + "i; (1)
or we could allow for heterogeneous strategy e¤ects of di¤erent groups of banks
by writhing the regression as:
M1i = Xi1 + "1i (2)
M0i = Xi0 + "0i: (3)
Unfortunately, the problem of endogeneity could still be severe since it is usually
impossible to observe all factors conjointly a¤ecting performance outcomes and choice
of branching modes, and the omitted variables could lead to biased estimation if OLS
regressions are employed.
Following Heckman (1974, 1978), we propose a two-step estimation method to
get unbiased estimations of strategy e¤ects of choice of interstate branching. In the
rst step, we apply a probit estimation by supposing that the mode choice depends
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on a continuous latent variable Si : if S

i passes some threshold (e.g., 0), S1 (de novo
branching) will be chosen while S0 will be chosen otherwise. At the same time,
we introduce an instrumental variable Zi which stands for a vector of factors only
a¤ecting strategy choice.18
The regression can be written as
Si = (M1i  M0i) + Zi +  i (4)
where Si = 1 (de novo) if Si > 0; Si = 0 (M&A) if S

i  0.
Substitute (2) and (3) for M1i and M0i , we obtain
Si = Xi + Zi +  i (5)
where  i = ("1i   "0i)+  i and  = (1   0) We assume all error terms are
joint normal distributions.
From the above probit estimation, we can get an estimation of  and .
In the second step, we want to obtain an unbiased estimation of 1and 0using
results from the rst step.
From (2) and (5) , we have:
E("1ijS1) = E("1ijSi > 0)
=  u1(Xi + Zi)=(Xi + Zi) = u11i; (6)
and similarly, we have:
E("0ijS0) = E("0ijSi  0)
18In this study, we choose host state concentration, entrant bank bargaining power and distance
between the entrant bank headquarters state and host state as instrumental variables.
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= u0(Xi + Zi)=[1  (Xi + Zi)] = u00i (7)
where  is normal density,  is the cumulative normal density. u1 = cov( i; "1i);u0 =
cov( i; "0i):
1i and 0i represent the so-called inverse Mills ratio in the literature.
Then, we adjust (2) and (3) with (6) and (7) to get
M1i = Xi1   u1(Xib + Zib)=(Xib + Zib)+ e1i (8)
and
M0i = Xi0 + u0(Xi
b + Zib)=[1  (Xib + Zib)]+ e0i (9)
where E(e0ijS0) = E(e1ijS1) = 0:
Note that after correction for self-selection, we can easily obtain unbiased estima-
tors of 1, 0, u1and u0 through OLS regressions.
We will elaborate on this situation when we discuss the results.
4 Variables and Hypotheses
4.1 Dependent Variable: Performance Outcome
In an ideal situation, we would capture the performance of a banks branches by
measuring its revenue and operating costs. Unfortunately, the Call Report and other
available data sources only provide information of this kind at the institution level
so that we cannot isolate branch performance for each market (state). To tackle this
problem, we need to nd the appropriate proxies of branch performance based on
available information.
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Firstly, as indicated in Orlow, Radecki and Weminger (1996), the key function
of a branch network lies in the collection of deposits so that all else being equal,
the more deposits that are held at branches, the greater the prot. Note that for a
branch with more deposits, the xed costs of operating could be spread across a wider
deposit base. Furthermore, higher levels of deposits are also associated with a higher
premium in branch sales (Edelstein and Morgan, 2004). Besides, the information on
the deposits of a banks branches in every single market is available in the Summary
of Deposits at the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) website. Therefore,
we choose total deposits as one of the branch performance proxies. Secondly, since
larger market shares in the banking industry are associated with a greater exercise of
market power and higher prots (Berger, 1995), we also take the deposit market share
of branches in the host state as a measure of the branchesperformance outcomes.
Similarly, we take the number of branches an entrant bank owns in the market as
another measure of its performance since the more branches it has, the more deposits
it can collect through them.
Another noteworthy fact is that branches might have di¤erent developing curves:
De novo branches start with nothing and generally need more time to mature while
branches set up via M&A inherit the achievement of the acquired branches. They
thus start from a higher point, although they also need some time to adjust to the new
management and operating strategies. Considering these factors, we record branch
performance measures of entrant banks up to two years after their entries.19
19Due to the limitation of sample size, the current study only focuses on the short-run performance
of branches.
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4.2 Factors A¤ecting Branching Mode Choice and Performance Outcome
4.2.1 Entrant Banks E¢ ciency Advantage
Some studies (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002, Giltert and Newbery, 1992
and McCardle and Viswanathan, 1994) suggest that the likelihood of entry via M&A
could be positively related to the di¤erence between the e¢ ciency of the entrant and
the average e¢ ciency of the incumbents. The rationale is that the more e¢ cient the
entrant compared with incumbents, the greater the entrants potential e¢ ciency gain
by merging with or acquiring ine¢ cient incumbents. For publicly traded rms, the
nancial literature authors (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) usually use Tobins
q or charter value to measure rmse¢ ciency. Unfortunately, market-based e¢ ciency
measures are not available to our study since only a handful of banks in our sample
issue publicly traded stocks. Therefore, we use accounting ratios such as ROA and
the liability ratio to measure entrant bankse¢ ciency. At the same time, since we
have access to the average ROA of banks in each state, we can obtain the e¢ ciency
advantage by calculating the ROA di¤erence between entrant banks and incumbent
banks. Furthermore, a larger e¢ ciency advantage is expected to bring about better
performance outcomes.
4.2.2 Size
Many economists who oppose restrictions on de novo interstate branching are most
concerned with the barriers caused by those restrictions. These would deter banks of
small size from entering the protected market since the high cost of acquiring another
bank is usually una¤ordable to small banks. This concern also indicates that small
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banks tend to interstate branch via de novo branching. Therefore, we expect that the
tendency of a bank to interstate branch by setting up do novo branches is negatively
related to the entrant banks size. At the same time, large banks usually have a higher
reputation and greater credibility, which are crucial factors when collecting deposits
from consumers (Woodward 1988). In this study, an entrant banks size is dened as
the log of its total assets (in thousands).
4.2.3 Market Protability Potential
Following similar logic as above, when an entrant bank faces a market with high
protability potential, the management might be less concerned with the signicant
decrease in prot surplus that comes with de novo branching. Also, some studies
on the determination of premium payments in M&A show that premium payments
are usually positively correlated with market growth (e.g., Hirtle, 2005) so that en-
trant banks might want to avoid even higher premium payments in markets with a
higher market growth rate by choosing the entry mode of de novo branching. As in
Hirtle (2005), we take market-level aggregate personal income growth and per capita
personal income growth in the year prior to the time the entry occurs as the mea-
sure of market protability potential. Also, other factors being equal, high market
protability potential suggests high performance outcomes.
4.2.4 Instrumental Variables
In order to correct for the endogeneity lying in banksself-selection in choosing the
mode of interstate branching, we need to nd some instrumental variables to capture
the factors that a¤ect only the choice of branching mode. Based on our previous
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discussion, we choose the following three instrumental variables.
4.2.5 Market Concentration
According to the previous discussion, a high level of concentration (HHI>1800)
means a high entry barrier to de novo branches, so that entrant banks would be prone
to establish their interstate branches via M&A. Nevertheless, high concentration also
means high potential prot surplus for a new competitor in this market, which could
make entrant banks more likely to enter via de novo branching. Similarly, when the
market concentration is low (HHI<1000), the market is competitive and relatively
close to the free entrylevel, which, according to previous discussion, means entrant
banks would be more reluctant to enter via de novo branching. This mode would
signicantly drag down the prot surplus after entrance into the market. The rela-
tively low entry barrier in a more competitive market could also tempt entrant banks
to set up de novo branches to avoid paying the high premium associated with ac-
quiring incumbent banks. Considering these two potentially confounding e¤ects, the
impact of competition level on entrant bankschoice of entry mode could be either
way, depending on which e¤ect dominates. The statistically insignicant correlation
between market concentration level and performance variables conrms the qualica-
tion of market concentration as an instrumental variable. Note that the traditional
measure of the competition level of one market is HHI, which is dened as the square
sum of the market share of participants in the market. The higher the HHI, the more
concentrated is the market, which means a lower level of competition.20
20In this estimation, we constructed three dummy variables indicating low,medianand high
levels of concentration based on actual HHI values.
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4.2.6 Geographical Diversity
The previous literature indicates that banks expanding into many states usually
have two characteristics: higher bargaining power and lower entry cost. The bargain-
ing power of an entrant comes from his credibility of entry. The theoretical model
predicts that when the incumbents believe that if they could not reach an M&A
agreement with the potential entrant, the entrant would enter the market via direct
investment, which would more severely challenge their future protability. As a re-
sult, the entrants would have more bargaining power to obtain better deals, which
would give them more incentive to enter via M&A. In this case, the likelihood of an
entrant bank to enter via de novo branching should be negatively related to the num-
ber of states into which this entrant bank has expanded thanks to the high credibility
of entry. Nevertheless, if a bank has a history of entering many other markets, this
bank is much likely to have a low entry cost, which could result from many factors
such as high operating e¢ ciency, a good reputation or prompt responsiveness to the
new market. If this is the case, the likelihood of an entrant bank to enter via de
novo branching should be positively related to the number of states into which it
has expanded. Apart from the inconclusive relation between the number of states
involved in a banks expansion and an entrant banks choice of interstate branching
mode, note the fact that branch performance in an individual market mainly depends
on the customerschoice of banks in which to deposit their money. Also note that
depositors tend to care more about direct health indicators such as size and balance
sheet ratios than indecisive factors such as geographical diversity. The signicant cor-
relation between the number of states into which an entrant bank has expanded and
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the interstate branching mode choice, as well as the insignicant correlation between
geographical diversity and branch performance variables, also justies our choice of
instrumental variable.
4.2.7 Distance to Host Market
This instrumental variable is chosen based on an application of the integra-
tion/responsiveness framework in international economics literature (Rosenzweig and
JV, 1991). These studies reveal that a corporation focusing more on integration strat-
egy would pay more attention to the scale of economy as a whole and care less about
the responsiveness to individual markets, while the reverse is true for a corporation
with multi-market strategies. Harzing (2002) applies this theory in analyzing the
choice of entry mode into foreign markets and argues that corporations with global
strategies would be more likely to enter the new foreign market via greeneld invest-
ment (establish a subsidiary from scratch), while corporations with multi-domestic
strategies would be more likely to enter via M&A. Because they care more about
the responsiveness to the local market, acquiring an existing rm better suits their
purpose in this sense. Our study applies this framework in examining entry mode
choice in the domestic market, which is considered a miniature of the international
market.
A multi-state bank that weighs signicantly upon the competition in the whole
domestic market will integrate its branches in a geographical sense to achieve highest
economy of scale. Nevertheless, a multi-state bank that cares more about performance
and competition in individual markets needs to nd the most protable markets
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(not necessarily close to each other) and to be more responsive to local markets.
In this case, branching via M&A would be superior to de novo branching, since it
could signicantly alleviate the problem of information asymmetry about local market
between entrants and incumbents.
In the present study, we use the distance from the state where an entrant banks
headquarters is located to the host state to indicate an entrant banks preference
in expansion strategy. If an entrant bank targets a distant market, its expansion
strategy more resembles that of a multi-market bank and involves more emphasis
on responsiveness to the local market, thus preferring de novo branching to M&A.
Otherwise, if an entrant bank targets a close market, it tends to benet from the
economy of scale and care less about responsiveness to the new market. It thus
prefers M&A to de novo branching. Also, we assume that this kind of intricate factor
may not a¤ect customerschoice of banks in which deposit their money, so that it is
likely to be independent of the branch performance of entrant banks. The result of
the correlation test also supports our choice of this instrumental variable.
5 Data Summary and Descriptions
We chose nine states and the District of Columbia that allow interstate branching
to test our hypotheses on the determination of interstate branching mode choice
and its impact on branch performance outcomes. From the Summary of Deposits
made available at www.fdic.gov, we identify all multi-state commercial banks in these
states from 1996 to 2004 which have at least three years of available data on branch
performance. By matching the identities of multi-state commercial banks of each
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state in adjacent years, we determine the entrant multi-state commercial banks of
each market in each year from 1997 to 2004. Next, by checking the activity histories of
each multi-state commercial bank among these entrants, we determine their interstate
branching mode: If they entered into a new market through M&A, the event will show
up in the activity history. If a multi-state commercial bank did enter a market without
a specic description in activity history, we took it as entering into a market through
de novo branching. In the end, we obtained 145 entry events that occurred among
these states through 1997 to 2004. Among these 145 events, 42 were realized through
M&A and the rest of 103 were realized through de novo branching.21 The deposit
amount and the market share data of branches of each entrant multi-state commercial
bank in a state are available at the FDIC Summary of Deposits. Demographic and
state economy data are available at the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Information on
bank activity history can be obtained from the institution directory at FDIC website.
Balance sheet data were derived from Call Reports of commercial banks, which are
available at the website of the federal bank in Chicago.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of primary explanatory variables.
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of performance variables categorized by
entrant banksinterstate branching modes. The simple description shows that entrant
banks choosing interstate branching via M&A generally performed better in the tar-
geted market than entrant banks choosing de novo interstate branching. However,
21We actually identied 208 interstate branching events during this time period. However, we
had to exclude events involving non-commercial bank entrants since FDIC Call Report data are
only available for commercial banks. There might be di¤erent regulations on entry by these non-
commercial banks.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables A¤ecting Entry Mode Choice
Mean Minimum Maximum Std # of Obs
Median concentration 0.29 0 1 0.46 145
High concentration 0.12 0 1 0.33 145
Low concentration 0.59 0 1 0.49 145
Per capita income growth 1.33 -4.18 3.82 1.63 145
Income growth 2.64 -3.82 6.32 1.75 145
Return on assets di¤erence 0.24 -4.82 19.93 2.53 145
log assets 14.50 10.21 20.06 2.45 145
Liability ratio 11.19 3.58 18.10 2.59 145
Charter type 0.46 0 1 0.50 145
Bargaining power 2.09 0 9.00 1.86 145
Log distance 6.14 0.95 3.33 7.98 145
This table presents the summary statistics of variables with potential impact on bankschoices of interstate
branching mode. Median concentration, high concentration and low concentration are dummies variables indicating
whether the host markets are fairly, highly (HHI>1800) or lowly concentrated(HHI<1000). Per capita income
growth and income growth are ination-adjusted growth rate percentages at the per capita level and aggregate level.
The return on assets di¤erence is the gap between an entrant banks ROA and the average ROA of incumbent banks
in the host market one year before it enters the market. Lnsize is the natural logarithm of ination-adjusted total
assets. Chartertype is a dummy variable that attains 1 when an entrant bank is state-chartered and 0 otherwise.
Bargaining power is the number of states to which an entrant bank has expanded before it enters a new market. Log
distance is the natural logarithm of the miles between the state in which an entrant banks headquarter is located
and the targeted market. Aggregate income and bank assets are adjusted to 1996 dollars.
we will apply the two-stage Heckman Estimation to correct for the potential sample
selection bias to see if one entry mode is actually superior to the other.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of interstate branching events by year. We can
see that de novo branching was obviously the dominant entry mode during the time
period after the Riegle-Neal Act took e¤ect, which contrasts with what is recorded
in studies on entry activities before interstate branching deregulation.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of interstate branching events by the concentration
level of host states. From the distribution, we can see that the preference upon de novo
interstate branching was most signicant in markets with a low level of concentration
(67 vs. 18) and was weakest in market with median level of concentration (23 vs. 19).
In markets with a high level of concentration, the preference is also evident, according
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Table 3.2 :
Descriptive Statistics for Performance Variables
Subsample A: Entrants Choosing De Novo Interstate Branching (103)
Mean Minimum Maximum Std # of Obs
Market share 1.22 0 27.14 4.01 103
Market share_1 1.66 0 23.09 4.67 90
Market share_2 1.87 0 22.01 4.61 73
Branch number 17.27 1 293.00 49.47 103
Branch number_1 23.11 1 392.00 63.37 90
Branch number_2 31.96 1 340.00 69.28 74
Log (total deposit) 9.77 0.60 15.99 2.89 94
Log (total deposit)_1 10.47 5.19 16.43 2.43 86
Log (total deposit)_2 10.91 6.90 16.48 2.47 70
Subsample B: Entrants Choosing Interstate Branching via M&A (42)
Mean Minimum Maximum Std # of Obs
Market share 3.35 0 32.17 6.76 42
Market share_1 3.40 0 28.70 6.57 39
Market share_2 3.38 0 26.63 6.28 36
Branch number 47.93 1.00 270.00 79.89 42
Branch number_1 50.33 1.00 259.00 80.62 39
Branch number_2 46.25 1.00 240.00 73.32 36
Ln(total deposit) 12.55 6.64 16.17 2.19 41
Ln(total deposit)_1 12.46 7.87 16.17 2.19 39
Ln(total deposit)_2 12.73 9.15 16.14 1.88 35
This table presents the summary statistics of variables measuring entrant banksperformance up to two years after
the entry. The calculation of market shares is based on deposits. The simple description shows that entrant banks
choosing interstate branching via mergers and acquisitions generally performed better in the targeted market than
entrant banks choosing de novo interstate branching. Total deposits are adjusted to 1996 dollars.
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Figure 2: This gure shows the frequencies of two interstate branching modes in each year from 1997 to 2004.
to the gure.
6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Interstate Branching Mode Choice
The results of rst stage Heckman estimation, which examines the determinants
of interstate branching mode choice, are presented in Table 3.3.
The rst noteworthy fact is that the entry mode choice has no relation to the
entrant bankscharter type, which justies our assumption that all entrant multi-
state commercial banks could freely choose an interstate branching mode whether
they are national or state-chartered banks.
Across all regression specications, the coe¢ cients of bank size are always negative
and signicant at the 1% percent level. Our previous discussion shows that banks of
small size usually cannot a¤ord high premium costs associated with M&A and thus
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Table 3.3:
Results of First Stage Heckman Estimation: Interstate Branching Mode Choice
1 2 3 4
Intercept 4.9153***
(<.0001)
4.1185***
(0.0008)
3.7929***
(0.0016)
4.7117***
(<.0001)
Median
concentration -0.7595***
(0.0052)
0.7024*
(0.0780)
-0.8244***
(0.0027)
High
concentration 0.7793***
(0.0069)
0.6382
(0.1063)
Low
concentration 0.8968***
(0.0025)
Per capita
Income growth -0.1871**
(0.0253)
-0.1783**
(0.0296)
Income growth -0.1696**
(0.0220)
-0.1690**
(0.0034)
ROA di¤erence 0.00784
(0.8744)
0.00803
(0.8713)
0.00841
(0.8657)
0.00967
(0.8459)
Log assets -0.2024***
(0.0033)
-0.2037***
(0.0034)
-0.2009***
(0.0038)
-0.1968***
(0.0041)
Liability ratio 0.0161
(0.7658)
0.0156
(0.7724)
0.0112
(0.8353)
0.0133
(0.8048)
Charter type -0.3547
(0.1739)
-0.3576
(0.1708)
-0.3554
(0.1737)
-0.3457
(0.1839)
Bargaining power 0.1712**
(0.0425)
0.1711**
(0.0426)
0.1667**
(0.0476)
0.1680**
(0.0462)
Log distance -0.1681
(0.2615)
-0.1587
(0.3103)
-0.1447
(0.3524)
-0.1743
(0.2434)
The dependent variable is the dummy variable that attained 1 when the entrant bank chose de novo interstate
branch and attained 0 otherwise. The reported results concern four primary regression specications and other
specications of similar kinds (e.g. ROA instead of ROA di¤erence, per capita income growth rate instead of
aggregate income growth rate, distance quintile instead of the log value of distance etc.) produce similar results.
Moreover, all regression specications satisfy convergence criteria and have a high level of ordinal variable
association. P-values are reported in parentheses. * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level. ** indicates
signicance at the 5 percent level. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 3: This gure shows the frequencies of two interstate branching modes regarding di¤erent competition
levels of target markets.
prefer de novo interstate branching. Since we use a natural logarithmic transform of
bank size, the signicant coe¢ cient also indicates the decreasing marginal e¤ect of
bank size on entrant banksinterstate branching mode choice.
As for the impact of entrant bankse¢ ciency on their choice of interstate branching
mode, our hypothesis seems not to be supported by the regression results. Coe¢ cients
of the ROA di¤erence between entrant banks and the host state average level as well
as entrant banksliability ratios are both insignicant. According to the results, it
seems that the potential e¢ ciency gains from acquiring incumbent banks are not
an inuential factor in choosing an interstate branching mode, although previous
empirical studies have found that the likelihood of M&A events are positively related
with an e¢ ciency gap between acquirers and targets. The possible reason is that
accounting variables such as ROA and liability ratio are not adjusted for company
size and only take into account the past performance, unlike Tobins q which is based
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on discounted present value. Therefore, accounting ratios may not be good measures
of entrant bankse¢ ciency so that we cannot observe the expected relation between
e¢ ciency gains and the choice of interstate branching mode.22
As for the impact of the number of states to which an entrant bank had expanded
on the choice of interstate branching mode, we obtained positive coe¢ cients at the 5%
signicance level in all model specications. When we restricted Probit regressions
to the sub-sample of entry events that occurred in markets of low concentration,
the coe¢ cient of the number of states to which an entrant bank had expanded was
signicant at the 1% level with larger magnitude (0.6997 v.s. 0.1712 in the full
sample). These results indicate that entrant banks that have expanded to more states
are more likely to expand to a new market via de novo branching to take advantage
of their low entry cost rather than to threaten incumbent banks with their entry
credibility to obtain better deals in M&A negotiation. Especially when the target
markets are lowly concentrated but not nearly competitive, where the impact of one
extra bank on incumbentsprot surplus is low, the bargaining power lying in the
entry credibility would not be very inuential.
Weve already seen from Figure 2 that in markets with low or high concentra-
tion, de novo interstate branching dominates the alternative mode. Our results con-
rmed this nding. Specically, the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable, which indicates
whether the target market is lowly concentrated (HHI<1000), are positive and signif-
icant at the 1% level. The coe¢ cient of the high concentration (HHI>1800) dummy
22This topic could be dealt with in future research by expanding the data source and employing
more precise e¢ ciency measures such as Tobins Q.
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variable is also positive although barely signicant in statistic sense. Similarly, in
regression models incorporating only a median concentration dummy instead of low
and high concentration, the coe¢ cient of the median concentration dummy is nega-
tive and signicant at the 1% level, which is consistent with results from alternative
regression specications. These results imply that when the entry barrier is low, en-
trant banks prefer de novo branching to branching via M&A without much concern
with the possible shrinking of prot surplus following their entry. Nevertheless, when
facing a highly concentrated market, entrant bankspreference regarding the inter-
state branching mode could be ambiguous: Some of them might be more concerned
with the entry barrier and thus prefer to enter via M&A, while others might still pre-
fer de novo branching since the premium cost could be high in highly concentrated
markets.23 Moreover, when facing a market of a normal level of concentration, entrant
banks seem to care more about the potential deduction of prot surplus and prefer
entrance via M&A.
Also note that the coe¢ cients of distance between states entrant banksheadquar-
ters and target markets are all positive across all regression specications, which is
consistent with our hypothesis. An entrant bank targeting a distant market is more
likely to take a multi-marketstrategy, which requires prompt responsiveness to the
local market. Thus, acquiring an established organization from a target market is
superior in this sense. Similarly, an entrant bank that aims at expanding to mar-
23Studies on the determination of merger premium show mixed results on the relation of merger
premium and market concentration. For example, Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987) found a
positive and signicant relationship while other authors found no signicant relationship (Hakes et
al., 1997; Brewer et al., 2000b).
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kets close to where its headquarters takes a unite-marketstrategy, which requires
economy of scale so that it would be likely to set up its own de novo branches to
conveniently align the operations of all subsidiaries in order to realize the economy of
scale. However, the lack of the statistical signicance of coe¢ cients implies that this
factor is not the crucial one in determining the entry mode decision, although this
framework from international trade works to some extent.
Another noteworthy nding is the consistently signicant negative relation be-
tween the likelihood of de novo branching and economic prospects of target markets,
which is contrary to our hypothesis. However, this result makes much more sense
when we take into account the transitional stage of a new competing bank in a mar-
ket. A de novo branch would need up to ve years to ght the entry barrier and to
mature, while acquiring an established incumbent bank means prompt acceptance in
the market. At the same time, we need to note that the economic potential cannot
last long either. Therefore, when entering a market that has particular economic
potential,24 entrant banks would be more likely to take advantage of the prompt re-
sponsiveness and acceptance of acquired banks so as to benet from the temporary
economic thriving of the host markets.
6.2 Branch Performance
To correct for the possible endogeneity, we apply a two-stage Heckman estimation.
After obtaining the inverse Mills ratios from the rst-stage Probit regression, we can
get unbiased estimated coe¢ cients on the determinants of branch performance with
24Many studies on entry decision have found a positive relation between marketseconomic po-
tential and the likelihood of their being targeted.
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OLS regression in the second stage. Note that the main goal of this study is to see
how entrant bankschoices of interstate branching mode impact their performance in
the host market and whether entrant banks would have performed better if they had
chosen the alternative branching mode. Nevertheless, the information on whether
an entrant bank could have been better o¤ by switching to the alternative interstate
branching mode cannot simply be derived from coe¢ cients of determinants. The
solution to this di¢ culty is to calculate the treatment e¤ect on the treated (Heckman
and Robin 1985, Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). In our study, the treatment e¤ect
on the treated is the expected performance gain of rms choosing strategy by Si
switching to S i strategy.
Specically,
E(M1  M0jS1;Xi)
= Xi(1   0) + (u0   u1)(Xib + Zib)=(Xib + Zib) (10)
for banks choosing de novo interstate branching;
E(M1  M0jS0;Xi)
= Xi(1   0) + (u1   u0)(Xib + Zib)=[1  (Xib + Zib)] (11)
for banks choosing interstate branching via M&A.
Before we present the estimated treatment e¤ect on the treated, let us take a
closer look at the coe¢ cients on Mills ratios, u0 and u1;which can provide us with
valuable insights into the comparative advantage of two types of entry strategies.
Recall that the expected performance of banks observed entering via de novo
branching is E(M1ijS1) = Xi1   u1(Xib + Zib)=(Xib + Zib) and the Mill ra-
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tios are always positive. Therefore, a negative u1 means the expected performance
E(M1ijS1) > Xi1 and also note that Xi1is the expected performance with strategy
S1 for all banks. This situation implies that if entrant banks choosing M&A had cho-
sen de novo interstate branching, their expected performance would be lower than that
of banks actually choosing de novo interstate branching. In the literature, this case
is called positive selection into strategy S1 . Conversely, a positive u1 implies that
banks choosing strategy S1 have the below average performance which means that if
banks that actually chose the M&A interstate branching mode had taken the alterna-
tive strategy, they would have had better performance than that of banks that actually
chose de novo branching. In the literature, this case is called negative selection into
strategy S1 . Also, recall that the expected performance of banks choosing inter-
state branching via M&A is E(M0ijS0) = Xi0+u0(Xib+Zib)=[1 (Xib+Zib)].
Following the same logic, we can see that a negative u0 means that E(M0ijS0) <
Xi0;which implies a negative selection into strategy S0,while a positive u0 implies
a positive selection into strategy S0.
When we take both the signs of u1and u0 into account, if u1 < 0 and u0 > 0,
we see that both categories of banks chose strategies in which they have comparative
advantages since they all had above average performance. In the case that u1 > 0 and
u0 > 0, banks choosing the interstate branching mode of M&A have the absolute
advantage over banks choosing de novo interstate branching since no matter what
strategy they took, they could perform better than their counterpart. Similarly, in
the case where u1 < 0 and u0 < 0, banks choosing de novo interstate branching
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Table 3.4:
Results of the Second Stage Heckman Estimation: Branch Performance
Performance Measures u1 u0
Log (Total deposits) -0.117
(0.922)
2.078*
(0.082)
Log (Total deposits)_1 1.525*
(0.075)
2.981*
(0.055)
Log (Total deposits)_2 1.312**
(0.013)
1.985
(0.131)
Branch number 51.200**
(0.018)
120.483***
(0.008)
Branch number_1 74.376***
(0.007)
127.392**
(0.017)
Branch number_2 91.740***
(0.001)
130.476**
(0.016)
Market share 1.015
(0.579)
6.422
(0.119)
Market share_1 3.879**
(0.048)
7.992*
(0.090)
Market share_2 3.028**
(0.027)
8.914*
(0.059)
This table presents the results of the second stage Heckman estimations. Dependent variables are performance
variables. Estimation of covariances between the interstate branching mode and error terms are reported with
P-values in parentheses. * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level. ** indicates signicance at the 5 percent
level. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.
have the absolute advantage over banks choosing the alternative strategy. The latter
case, where u1 > 0 and u0 < 0; means all banks chose the strategy with which they
would have a relative disadvantage, a situation that would rarely happen in real life.
Table 3.4 shows the results of second-stage Heckman Estimation.25
The results regarding the estimations of u1(the coe¢ cient of the inverse Mills
ratio for banks entering via de novo branching) show that for all three types of
25The results of second-stage Heckman estimation for all six performance measures are based on
the rst model specication in the rst-stage Heckman estimation.
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performance measures (total deposits, total number of branches and the market share)
up to two years after entering the market, bu1is signicantly positive, especially for
the performance measure of branch numbers. This fact implies, that banks choosing
de novo interstate branching actually do not have a performance advantage over their
counterparts regarding this specic entry mode. Keep in mind that it does not mean
that banks choosing de novo branching should, however, have chosen the alternative
interstate branching mode. Nevertheless, bu0 (the coe¢ cient of the inverse Mills
ratio for banks interstate branching via M&A) are positive across all performance
measures, while only signicant at a high level (1% or 5%) for performance measures
of branch numbers. This result implies that unlike banks choosing de novo interstate
branching, banks choosing the M&A mode actually have performance advantage over
their counterparts, especially when the performance is measured by total branch
numbers. Therefore, the performance outcome of our sample regarding the entry
mode choice seems to fall into the case of u1>0 and u0>0 which, according to
our previous discussion, means that banks that actually chose interstate branching
via M&A have the absolute performance advantage compared with those banks that
chose the de novo mode of interstate branching.
In order to have a better understanding of this situation, we compare the results
from the rst-stage estimation regarding interstate branching mode choice and the
results from the second-stage estimation regarding performance outcome. Recall that
the likelihood of an entrant choosing de novo interstate branching is signicantly neg-
atively related to bank size and market protability potential such as income growth
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rate. Furthermore, for both subsamples, the performance outcomes are signicantly
positively related to bank size and market potential, which implies that banks choos-
ing the M&A interstate branching mode by naturehave the capability of achieving
better performance than do their counterparts.
However, the fact that banks choosing the M&A interstate branching mode con-
genitallyhave the performance advantage does not necessarily mean that de novo
branching is inferior to M&A as an interstate branching mode in general, since the
current results have not fully answered the question of did the banks make the right
decision? To put it more precisely, the question of would an entrant bank have
achieved better performance had the management chosen the alternative interstate
branching mode?And that is the rationale behind the concept of treatment e¤ect
on the treatedwhich has been previously discussed in detail.
Table 3.5 shows the treatment e¤ects on two subsamples of commercial banks
categorized by their interstate branching mode choice regarding three performance
measures up to two years after their entry.
Table 3.5 shows that the average treatment e¤ects on banks choosing de novo in-
terstate branching, E(M1 M0jS1;Xi); are signicantly positive across all performance
measures up to two years after the entry, except the performance measure of branch
numbers for which the treatment e¤ects are signicantly negative.26 Therefore, banks
choosing the interstate branching mode of de novo branching generally did choose the
mode to their own advantage since they might have achieved signicantly less if they
26It seems that banks choosing de novo interstate branching could have set up more branches in
the transitional stage if they had entered markets via M&A.
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Table 3.5:
Treatment E¤ect for the Treated
Performance Di¤erence if Taking the Alternative Entry Mode
Performance Measures Panel A (De novo) Panel B (M&A)
Log (Total deposits) 4.23***
(0.000)
1.10***
(0.000)
Log (Total deposits)_1 3.08***
(0.000)
0.74***
(0.006)
Log (Total deposits)_2 3.96***
(0.000)
3.23***
(0.000)
Branch number -85.96***
(0.000)
-207.74***
(0.000)
Branch number_1 -47.92***
(0.000)
-144.66***
(0.000)
Branch number_2 11.2***
(0.008)
-55.05***
(0.000)
Market share 0.09
(0.763)
-8.43***
(0.000)
Market share_1 4.49***
(0.000)
-1.91***
(0.001)
Market share_2 2.48***
(0.000)
-6.37***
(0.000)
This table reports the possible performance change if entrant banks had chosen the alternative interstate branching
mode. The mean of the treatment e¤ects on the treated are reported for two groups of banks categorized by their
choice of interstate branching mode. The associated P-values are also reported in the parentheses. In most cases,
entrant banks could not have improved their branch performance if they had chosen the alternative interstate
branching mode since average treatment e¤ects for the treated of the banks choosing de novo interstate branching are
signicantly positive across almost all performance measures. However, the performance measure of branch number
and average treatment e¤ects for the treated of the banks choosing interstate branching via mergers and acquisitions
are signicantly negative across almost all performance measures except total deposits. * indicates signicance at
the 10 percent level. ** indicates signicance at the 5 percent level. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.
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had taken the alternative strategy. As for the other group of banks that chose to enter
via M&A, the average treatment e¤ects on the treated are signicantly negative for
performance measures of branch numbers and market share (E(M1 M0jS0;Xi) < 0),
which means that banks that did choose to enter via M&A would have built up fewer
branches and gained less of the market share if they had taken the alternative strat-
egy. Thus, banks choosing the interstate branching mode of M&A also made the right
decision in this sense. However, the treatment e¤ect regarding the capacity to collect
deposits shows the opposite results ( E(M1  M0jS0;Xi) > 0). This outcome implies
that banks that entered the market via M&A might have collected more deposits
if they had chosen de novo interstate branching instead. Therefore, in most cases,
entrant banks could not have improved their branch performance if they had chosen
the alternative interstate branching mode, which also means that bank managements
did make the right decision on the choice of interstate state branching mode.
7. Concluding Remarks
The banking industry is usually excluded from theoretical and empirical studies
on general manufacturing industries due to the complication of extensive regulations
upon this industry and the special characteristics of banks as intermediation service
suppliers. That is why there many questions on banking management strategies are
left unanswered. This study aims to empirically answer one of these questions which
has brought forth much debate among industry regulators, government lawmakers
and economists: whether it is warranted to allow banks to freely establish de novo
branches nationwide. To answer this question, we make it clear that the opponents
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of deregulation on de novo branching are mainly concerned that multi-state banks
branching into local markets would dominate incumbent banks in performance and
radically take away market shares and prots. Although to my knowledge, there are
few studies dwelling on the impact of this specic interstate branching mode, some
studies do shed some light on the impact of general interstate branching on market
concentration and general performance of the banking industry (e.g., Hughes et al.,
1996, Berger and De Young, 2000). Our study contributes to the literature in two
ways. Firstly, we choose a fresh angle from which to consider this question: We
propose to examine the impact of interstate branching mode choice on entrant banks
performance in host markets rather than the conventional angle taken in the literature
that examines the impact of the occurrence of entry events on the entire market
(e.g., a change of market concentration) or industry (general e¢ ciency improvement).
Therefore, the theoretical foundation of our study borrows theories and concepts from
elds such as industrial organization and management strategy as well as money and
nance since we are more interested in individual entrant banksperformance in host
markets. Secondly, the application of a two-stage Heckman estimation corrects for
the endogeneity problem, which is usually neglected in conventional studies on the
impact of management strategy on performance.
Basically, we nd that without interstate branching restriction, small commercial
banks signicantly prefer de novo interstate branching to branching via M&A. When
the host market is lowly competitive (HHI<1000), entrant banks would be more likely
to take the mode of de novo branching than to take the mode of M&A. Moreover,
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the high potential of economic growth seems to tempt entrant banks to enter via
M&A more than via de novo branching. In addition, the more states to which an
entrant bank has expanded its service, the more likely is this entrant bank to enter
via de novo branching. After tackling the endogeneity lying in the selection bias,
the performance estimations and derived treatment e¤ects regarding the three groups
of performance measures up to two years after entry, we show that entrant banks
choosing interstate branching via M&A have absolute performance advantages over
entrant banks setting up de novo branches in achieving market shares, building up
more branches and collecting deposits. However, both groups of banks categorized by
their choice of interstate branching mode made the right decision because they would
not have been better o¤ had they chosen the alternative strategy. Therefore, free
interstate de novo branching would invite more small banks, which can greatly benet
the development of small business of the host state without signicantly threatening
incumbent banks.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
My dissertation empirically addresses some unanswered questions that have mo-
tivated much debate among banking practitioners, government lawmakers and econo-
mists by investigating two natural experiments provided by regulatory reform.
Chapter II examines the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) on the "timeliness" and "e¤ectiveness" of market
discipline imposed by uninsured depositors. I set up a theoretical framework of mar-
ket discipline based on Jordan (2000) in which the market for deposits is described as
an interaction between the supply side (both insured and uninsured depositors) and
the demand side (banks) wherein market discipline is captured by an upward shifting
marginal cost curve for uninsured deposits as bank default risk increases. I collect
quarterly data for U.S. commercial banks for ve years prior to the FDICIA (1984-
1989) and ve years after the FDICIA began to take e¤ect (1992-1996), and construct
the risk measures based on accounting data available from Call Reports. Along with
controlling for e¤ects from the demand side, I employ two-way Granger causality
tests with the application of the generalized method of moments technique developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) for panel data to capture the timeliness(predictive
power of changes in risk measures on changes in the interest rate spread) and e¤ec-
tiveness(predictive power of changes in the interest rate spread on changes in risk
measures) of market discipline imposed by uninsured depositors such as Jumbo CD
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holders. I nd clear-cut evidence that the improved regulatory environment provided
by the FDICIA successfully revived incentives for uninsured depositors to monitor -
nancial institutionsdefault risks, and has motivated nancial institutions to be more
responsive to market discipline by engaging in "self-corrective" actions. The results
imply that policy or regulatory choices, such as deposit insurance, could bring cost to
the economy by interfering with the implementation of the markets self-regulation,
such as market discipline. Therefore, the optimization of regulatory devices should
take into account the real costs from various aspects.
Chapter III investigates the impact of the choice of interstate branching mode
on entrant banksbranch performance in host markets based on interstate commer-
cial banksoperating strategies in the states that permit both interstate branching
via acquisitions and setting up de novo branches after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994.
The theoretical foundation is based on theories and concepts from industrial orga-
nization and management strategy as well as monetary economics. The application
of two-stage Heckman estimation corrects for endogeneity problems that are usually
neglected in conventional studies measuring the impact of management strategy on
performance. I also derive the entrant bankscounterfactual performance gains/losses
associated with taking the alternative interstate branching mode to test whether bank
managements made the right strategic decisions. The results indicate that under sev-
eral well-dened circumstances, the de novo interstate branching mode is preferred
to M&A, and entrant banks choosing interstate branching via M&A have absolute
performance advantages over entrant banks setting up de novo branches. At the same
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time, both groups of banks categorized by their choice of interstate branching mode
seem to have made the right decision. Therefore, free interstate de novo branching
might encourage more small banks to enter the industry, which could prove bene-
cial to the development of small business within the host state without posing much
threat to incumbent banks.
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